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Abstract 
Vocational education and training provision for young people is a crucial but often maligned 
part of the wider education sector. A common criticism, and motivation for numerous reforms 
across countries where training is predominantly classroom-based, is that too much training is 
low quality and unrelated to skill needs. This paper examines the effects of a major Australian 
reform – replacing a centrally-planned model with a system-wide voucher scheme – aimed at 
addressing these weaknesses. The reform led to large increases in private college enrolments, 
improved match between course choice and employer demand, and improved student 
achievement, with no adverse impact on equity.  
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1. Introduction 
Post-secondary VET provides young people, including early school leavers, with accessible 
opportunities to continue education beyond school. Positive spillovers and borrowing 
constraints are among the motivations for extensive public funding of the sector (Stevens 
1999). A major challenge for government; however, is allocating public funding in a way that 
promotes training that is high quality and relevant to skill needs. This is most acute for VET in 
countries, such as the United States, England, New Zealand and Australia, where the allocation 
of funding to VET is mostly not linked to the attainment of employment (apprenticeships). 
Instead, post-secondary VET in these countries is predominantly classroom-based training in 
public colleges with complicated and over-lapping funding arrangements that have been 
subject to frequent and often piecemeal reform.1 Recent assessments of these VET systems, 
which in part blame existing funding models for persistent skill shortages and poor-quality 
training (e.g. Wolf, 2011; US Department of Education, 2012), suggest in some cases that the 
challenge remains unmet. 
Part of the problem is that there are strongly held beliefs on all sides about the extent to 
which, and how, market mechanisms should be employed in allocating public funding to VET 
providers. This is exacerbated by difficulties in comparing institutional impacts on outcomes 
across countries2 and a lack of credible quantitative evaluations of past VET reforms within 
countries. To begin to fill this gap, this paper uniquely provides detailed evidence on the 
impacts of a ‘big-bang’ system-wide reform that introduced market mechanisms to post-
secondary VET. Specifically, this paper examines impacts of a major national reform in the 
Australian state of Victoria – introduced earlier than in other Australian states – that replaced 
a centralised supply-driven funding model with a broad-based voucher scheme that linked 
funding to student course choice, including the choice of courses with private colleges. By 
quantifying the impacts of market-based reforms in Victoria, this study will help build an 
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evidence base to inform reforms elsewhere; without which, it is difficult to build a case, execute 
and maintain reforms in the face of opposition from vested interests. In Victoria, industry, 
public colleges and the media all cast doubt about whether the reforms could lift training quality 
and alleviate long-standing skill shortages.3 Due in part to the negative media, voucher schemes 
subsequently introduced in other Australian states included restrictions on course choice.  
As far as we are aware, this is the first study to estimate the impacts of a broad-based voucher 
scheme in VET on training relevance, measured as the alignment of course choice with 
information available on skill need, and academic achievement, a proxy for quality. Previous 
studies on the impacts of VET voucher schemes (Schwerdt et al., 2012; Hidalgo et al., 2014) 
examined small-scale targeted programs that complemented existing VET funding systems and 
therefore provide little guidance on the likely outcomes of system-wide reforms. Whether these 
reforms improved life-time earnings is outside the scope of this study, mainly because the data 
required are not currently available. 
This study also makes an important general contribution to the wider educational voucher 
literature by examining whether institutional characteristics that are supportive of 
disadvantaged groups are sufficient to ensure that any positive course choice and achievement 
impacts are widely shared. In the main, evidence to date on school choice reforms points to 
benefits that are not shared equally (see Epple et al. (2015) for a review). One explanation is 
that disadvantaged groups don’t benefit because of selection effects (by schools and families) 
that increase segregation (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006). Another is that they have difficulty 
accessing and utilising information on available education options (Levin, 1991; Ladd, 2002; 
Hastings and Weinstein, 2008). Under the conditions examined in this study there is little scope 
for selection — admission to a VET course is on a first-come-first-served basis, with 
restrictions on cream-skimming and fee caps — and information on skill needs (skill shortages) 
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is easily understood and freely available online. At least some of these characteristics are 
replicable in other educational contexts. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details for 
the VET sectors in the rest of Australia and for Victoria pre and post-reform. Section 3 briefly 
discusses potential mechanisms for reform impacts. Section 4 describes the data and defines 
the outcome measures. Section 5 discusses the empirical approach and related identification 
issues. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the findings relating to course choice and educational 
achievement, respectively. Section 8 discusses sensitivity analysis and Section 9 concludes. 
Additional data details and results are presented in a Supplementary Appendix.  
2. VET in Australia and the Victorian Training Guarantee (VTG) 
The Australian schooling system is similar to other English-speaking countries in that the 
student body is unstreamed and the upper-secondary curriculum is geared towards preparation 
for university study (study that leads to a 3-year bachelor degree). For those who do not have 
the academic credentials or desire to attend university, including the 20% who leave school 
without attaining an upper-secondary school qualification (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2016), VET is the main avenue to acquire post-school qualifications. The rate of participation 
is high, with around 40% of young people enrolling in a post-secondary VET course by age of 
25 (Polidano and Ryan 2016).  
Compared to university study, post-secondary VET courses are highly heterogeneous, with 
around 1,500 nationally accredited courses available at different levels (International Standard 
of Education Classification (ISCED) 1997 level 2C, 3C, 4B and 5B) geared towards preparing 
students for specific occupations. To attain qualifications students must demonstrate minimum 
competency in performing general and job-specific tasks that are prescribed in national training 
packages. National training packages are assembled by national skills councils that comprise 
representatives from government and employer groups. Except for apprenticeships and 
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traineeships (which require an employment contract) there is no requirement in training 
packages for competencies to be met through workplace learning. At present, there is no 
grading of students to gauge the level of skill proficiency attained beyond pass/fail. Although 
minimum training standards are set at a national level, each of the six states and two territories 
is responsible for funding and administering their own VET sector. 
Historically, states used a centrally-planned model for funding VET, one where fixed budget 
allocations were made at the course level across public providers (Technical and Further 
Education colleges (TAFEs), Adult and Community Education (ACE) centres and dual sector 
universities) based on historical enrolments and skill forecasts. Because VET is highly 
modularised, enrolments commence throughout the academic year and the limited numbers of 
places available pre-reform were rationed on a first-come-first-served basis. In practice, 
students could apply to multiple courses at multiple colleges at the same time and accept their 
offer of choice. Students who missed out on an offer from their preferred course at their 
preferred college could accept a place in the same course at a less preferred college, a less 
preferred course in their preferred college or re-apply the following year. There were no 
restrictions on the number of applications that could be made. As part of national reforms in 
2008, all Australian states agreed to introduce demand-driven models where funding follows 
student choice. Victoria was the first state to implement these reforms from July 1 2009, which 
for 15-19 year-olds went by the name of the Victorian Training Guarantee (VTG).4 Until July 
2012 when South Australia introduced its own reforms, all other states continued to operate 
their centrally-planned funding models.5 The Victorian reforms therefore represent a unique 
natural experiment on systemic VET reform which can be evaluated using standard difference-
in-differences methods. Note these reforms covered all age groups, but were most extensive 
for 15-19 year olds – the age group for which engagement in post-secondary VET is most 
common – on whom this paper focuses. 
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In essence, the VTG triggered three changes: the uncapping of the number of publicly-
funded places available to 15-19 year-olds, the linking of funding to student choice rather than 
provider capacity and government target areas, and the introduction of additional competition 
for funding from private colleges. By uncapping the number of publicly-funded places, 
individual providers were free to decide on the number of course admissions. The VTG did not 
affect public funding of the classroom component of apprenticeships and traineeships, which 
from 1998 had operated under a separate demand-driven system, including the freedom for 
employers to choose training with private colleges.6 During the period of analysis, all other 
arrangements remained much the same for 15-19 year-olds in Victoria (and elsewhere), 
including the course subsidy levels and the process of course admission described above.7  
An additional interesting aspect of this reform, in contrast to educational contexts where 
broad-based vouchers have been introduced previously, is that there are strong regulatory 
safeguards in Australian VET that aim to ensure equality of access. First, during the period of 
analysis, the ability of providers to raise prices in response to increased demand was limited 
by fee caps for publicly-funded VET courses that typically restricted fees charged direct to 
students to less than A$1000 per year for a full-time course.8 A potential downside of the price 
caps is that they may have dampened the incentive for colleges to innovate in response to 
increased competition and instead encouraged cost cutting and reduced training quality, 
although minimum training standards are set centrally and there is a monitoring system in 
place. Second, colleges have limited ability to cream-skim because there is little personal 
information made available in advance to providers on which to select students – open access 
is a defining feature of the Australian VET sector – which means that admission is typically 
made on a first-come first-served basis. Further, the incentive to cream-skim is reduced by 
registration requirements that compel colleges, including private colleges, to comply with 
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equity principles.9 Depending on the circumstances of the student, extra subsidies are also 
available to colleges to meet the extra cost of catering for ‘high needs learners’. 
Students who miss out on a subsidised place in training can enrol in an unregulated and 
unfunded ‘fee-for-service’ VET course, for which private colleges compete alongside public 
colleges in all states, although few 15-19 year olds take this route and consequently they are 
not part of the administrative collection used in this study. The best available data from the 
Longitudinal Survey of Australian Youth (LSAY), a large nationally representative survey of 
15 year-olds (in 2003) tracked annually to age 25, suggests that private fee-for-service 
enrolments prior to the VTG (2005-07) represented at most 9% of all 17-19 year-old VET 
enrolments.10 
3. Potential Mechanisms 
Course choice and educational achievement (in this case completion) can be thought of in 
terms of an underlying discrete-choice human capital framework in which potential students 
make enrolment decisions, and decisions to stay the course given initial enrolment, based on 
their perception of the expected course benefits and costs. Such a framework suggests several 
mechanisms through which the VTG might impact on course choice and achievement, 
including compositional changes in the student body, compositional changes on the supply side 
(Friedman, 1962; Anderson, 2005; Blochliger, 2008; Bettinger et al., 2010; Demming et al., 
2012; Rosenbaum and Rosenbaum, 2013), differences between students and government in the 
information used to assess labour market needs (Lavy, 2006; Jensen, 2010; OECD, 2010), 
disproportionate student weighting of consumption benefits of VET (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 
2011; Baker et al., 2017), competition impacts on quality and other aspects of provision 
(Friedman, 1962; Hoxby, 2003; Anderson, 2005; Figlio and Hart, 2014; Böhlmark and Lindahl, 
2015), and, for achievement, knock-on effects of VTG-induced changes in course choices and 
match quality (Bound and Turner, 2011). Additionally, there may be less scope post-reform for 
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funding allocations to be affected by inertia on the part of policy makers or lobbying by 
incumbent providers.  
Together these potential mechanisms point to VTG impacts of uncertain sign on both 
outcomes, hence the importance of credible empirical evidence. As part of our empirical 
strategy, we first estimate the overall reform effect – the net effect of all these mechanisms – 
using difference-in-differences estimation, before exploring the role of these individual 
mechanisms by adding additional controls that proxy them in a step-wise manner.  
4. Data 
The main dataset used in the analysis is the VET Provider Collection (VETPC), an annual 
administrative dataset containing the population of all VET enrolment activity in Australia, 
except for fee-for-service enrolments with private colleges. The VETPC contains detailed 
course, student and college information, and a unique student-course identifier that allows 
enrolments to be tracked across time and, in most cases, through to completion.  
The sample consists of all new enrolments among 15-19 year-olds – as of January 1st in the 
year of enrolment, which determines VTG eligibility – who are no longer in secondary school 
and who commenced study in 2006 to 2009 (pre-reform) or 2010 to 2012 (post-reform). 2009 
is treated as pre-reform despite the fact that the reforms were introduced in July 2009 because 
most enrolments occur at the start of the Australian academic year, i.e. January/February. Also 
note that post-reform counterfactual outcomes are potentially affected by the introduction of 
South Australian VET reforms in July 2012. Sensitivity to excluding both periods is examined 
in section 8.  
Table 1 summarises new enrolments in the sample. Enrolments in Victoria grew from 
62,179 in 2009, the final pre-reform period, to 116,015 by 2012, an 86% increase. In contrast, 
there were only minor increases in enrolment in the rest of Australia over this period — from 
160,718 in 2009 to 165,167 in 2012, or a 3% increase. Importantly, some of the courses that 
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experienced the largest enrolment increases (more than 500 enrolments annually) were in areas 
of national skill shortage; including courses that prepare students for work as child care 
workers, plumbers, hairdressers, electricians, cooks and child care managers (Table A5 in the 
Supporting Material). The growth in the number of enrolments in Victoria over this period is 
evenly split between public and private colleges, although private enrolment growth is from a 
much lower base. The decline in private college enrolments in both Victoria and the rest of 
Australia in 2008 is due to a decline in new apprenticeships related to the slowing of GDP 
growth that coincided with the global financial crisis. Note there is no noticeable increase or 
decrease in post-announcement but pre-reform enrolments in Victoria (August 2008-June 
2009), which otherwise might suggest anticipation effects.  
Table 2 presents sample means for student, college and course controls used in the analysis. 
Note there are only minor pre-reform differences in student characteristics between Victoria 
and the rest of Australia. Also note that the huge increase in enrolment in Victoria over this 
period was not drawn disproportionately from any one socio-economic or demographic group, 
with only minor impacts on a wide range of observed student characteristics.  
4.1 Outcome variables 
VTG impacts are examined on two key outcomes: the alignment of course choice with skill 
demand, and academic achievement, here interpreted as a (conditional) proxy for training 
quality. For course choice, two measures of ‘fit’ with labour market needs are derived using 
external data sources that are linked to course choices in the VETPC. Each year of the analysis, 
course enrolments are linked to information on labour market needs available at the start of the 
year (when most enrolments are made). In using the latest information available at the time of 
enrolment, the implicit assumption is that students make naïve forecasts of course outcomes 
based on current course information (Ryoo and Rosen, 2004; Heckman et al., 2006). 
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The first measure of labour market needs is a binary indicator for whether the occupation 
the course is designed to prepare students for is on a national skills shortage list.11 Skill shortage 
lists are prepared annually (usually published in August) by the federal government, based 
primarily on employer surveys and skill forecasts. Over the period of analysis, around 10% of 
all occupations were identified as being in national shortage, although there were distinct 
changes in the occupations and number of occupations on the list. The 2009-10 list, which is 
the one available at the start of 2010, listed around half the number of occupations compared 
to the previous year, reflecting the slowing of growth in Australia following the onset of the 
global financial crisis. When using the skill shortage measure, the analysis excludes around 
10% of enrolments that are in general and mixed field courses, such as numeracy and literacy 
and employment skills courses, that are not designed to prepare students for a particular 
occupation.  
The second course choice measure is a continuous variable constructed from estimated 
earnings premia associated with the most recent graduates in each national qualification level 
and field of study combination.12 These are estimated using annual earnings data from the 
Student Outcomes Survey (SOS), a large and nationally representative survey of VET 
graduates conducted in the year following course completion.13 The sampling frame for the 
SOS is the population of VET completers in the preceding year drawn from the VETPC dataset 
described above, and includes updated information on student characteristics and current 
labour market outcomes, including weekly earnings for those employed.14 Specifically, these 
data are used to estimate a log wage regression for completers aged 15-25 years at the time of 
survey on dummies for course-level and field-of-study combinations, with resulting 
coefficients interpreted as the average expected earnings premia from different course choices, 
conditional upon observed student controls and on finding employment in the year after study. 
It is important to point out that although the continuous nature of this measure may better 
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capture the extent of skill demand, course-level graduate earnings information was not readily 
available to students during the period of analysis.  
The VETPC data are also used to construct two measures of completion which, given VET 
qualifications in Australia are pass/fail, are the only available measures of educational 
achievement. The first completion measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the student has 
passed the course by the end of the year following entry, and 0 otherwise. Those who enrol in 
the first half of the year are therefore tracked for 18-24 months, which is beyond the typical 
course duration of 12-18 months. Some of those who enter in the second half of the year are 
tracked for less than 18 months, and some of these are treated as right censored given that the 
data do not distinguish within-year between those who dropped out and those who are still 
enrolled but yet to complete. In practice, right censoring affects enrolments in both Victoria 
and the rest of Australia and, if anything, the post-treatment growth in second semester 
enrolments in Victoria would tend to negatively bias any estimated completion effect in 
Victoria using this measure.  
The second completion measure is module (or subject) completion, which for a given course 
enrolment is the proportion of module enrolments that a student passes from the time of 
enrolment to the end of the following year. This is designed to reduce the right censoring 
problems discussed above, given that most students enrol in multiple modules in a semester 
typically lasting less than six months. This variable also helps to address the argument that 
some students enrol in a course only to learn a set of skills linked to a specific subset of 
modules, for example, to meet current job needs (see Mark and Karmel, 2010). Further details 
on enrolments, variable definitions and estimated course wage premia are contained in the 
Supplementary Appendix.  
5. Identification and estimation 
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In common with many previous school choice studies, differences across space are exploited 
to identify impacts. In particular, differences in the timing of national reform implementation 
between Victoria and the rest of Australia, which occurred for exogenous political reasons, are 
exploited here using a standard difference-in-differences approach (see Blundell and Costa 
Dias, 2009). Specifically, linear regressions of the following form are estimated:  
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝜏𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑉𝑖𝑐𝑖. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
(1) 
where, 
 𝜏𝑠 are state fixed effects; 
𝜆𝑡 are year and month of enrolment fixed effects;  
𝛿 is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT);  
𝑉𝑖𝑐𝑖 is a dummy variable for whether individual i’s enrolment was in the state of Victoria; 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable for whether the enrolment is in the post-reform period; 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains individual characteristics, including personal, college and course choice 
characteristics; 
𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a stochastic error term. 
As observed in Table 1, the post-reform enrolment growth was ongoing, which suggests 
other treatment effects may vary over the post-reform period. To test this, a dynamic 
treatment effects model is also estimated by extending equation (1): 
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝜏𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑝(𝑉𝑖𝑐𝑖. 𝑝)
2012
𝑝=2010
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
(2) 
 
where 𝑝  is a series of year dummy indicators for each of the post-reform periods.  
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A feature of our approach is the estimation of treatment effects under a range of assumptions 
regarding counterfactual outcomes. Under the standard difference-in-difference approach 
(implicit in equations 1 and 2), outcomes in the treatment group (Victoria) are assumed to 
follow a path that is parallel to that of the control group (Rest of Australia) in the absence of 
the reform. This is a restrictive and untestable assumption. In this study, we test the robustness 
of our results to alternative counterfactual trend assumptions. Specifically, in the main text we 
follow Jayachandran et al., (2010) and Groen and Polivka (2008) by also estimating (1) under 
a linear diverging trend assumption. That is, in the absence of the reform, the treatment group 
outcomes are assumed to linearly diverge from the control group trajectory at a rate that is 
consistent with any divergence pre-reform (2006-09).15 This is implemented (in equation 1) by 
including linear state-specific trend terms.16 In the sensitivity analysis, we also estimate results 
under non-linear diverging trend assumptions. Where there are no diverging trends pre-reform, 
results under both assumptions will be identical. 
5.1 Potential Threats to Identification of Causal Impacts 
Identification of causal impacts are contingent upon there being no other shock that 
differentially affected treatment and control groups over the period of analysis. There were no 
other major state-specific VET reforms over this period, and all states but one continued to 
operate the same funding models that had existed at the time of the national agreement on VET 
reform in 2008 without any subsequent reforms. The partial exception is South Australia, which 
introduced its own voucher scheme in July 2012. Sensitivity analysis tests the robustness of 
the results to the reforms in South Australia by omitting the second half of 2012 from the 
analysis. One possible threat to identification, however, is the introduction of an Australia-wide 
requirement in 2010 for all youth to remain in study until age 17, which may have affected 
Victoria differently because its minimum school leaving age was higher, at 16, than in many 
other states. To test whether this affects the results, models are re-estimated without those who 
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enrol at age 17 or younger. Results are presented in section 8. Another potential threat is 
differential economic shocks from the global financial crisis. However, it is important to stress 
that Australia was relatively unaffected by this crisis, with continued, albeit slower economic 
growth in 2008 and 2009. Nonetheless, controls for annual unemployment rates at the local 
government area are included in an effort to control for any asymmetric shocks from this 
source. A further test for differential state-level economic shocks is conducted by limiting the 
sample to enrolments in two neighbouring towns either side of the Victoria-New South Wales 
(NSW) border, for which such shocks are less likely. Results are presented in section 8. 
Although anticipation effects between announcement (August 2008) and implementation 
(July 2009) seem unlikely on the supply side, they seem at least possible on the demand side. 
For example, some Victorian 15-19 year olds may have waited for the VTG to access their 
course of choice rather than enrol in another publicly-funded or fee-for-service course. This 
could impact both course choice and completion. But as discussed above there is little evidence 
for such an effect. If anything, enrolments in Victoria slightly increased in the first half of 2009. 
Nevertheless, the robustness of estimates to announcement effects is addressed further in 
section 8 where results are estimated with the omission of enrolments from August 2008 until 
December 2009. 
A necessary condition to estimate the impacts of the VTG for a student body with given 
characteristics, i.e. the ATT, is that there are no relevant, asymmetric, unobserved changes in 
the composition of students. This is not directly testable, but the stability of observable 
characteristics between the pre and post-reform periods offers some reassurance (see Table 2). 
One potential threat here is cross-border VET commuting into Victoria induced by the VTG. 
In practice, however, this is not a major concern because, with the exception of the towns of 
Albury and Wodonga that straddle the Victoria-NSW border, few people live anywhere near 
the Victorian border. Table 2 shows that less than 3 percent of people studying in Victoria have 
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an interstate residential address, and this proportion is lower in the post-reform period. 
Nevertheless a control for this is included. 
All standard errors are cluster-robust, with clustering at the state and territory level (group 
size of 8 or G=8). Because the group size is small, a conservative approach is adopted and 
significance levels are reported using critical values from the T(G-1) distribution, as suggested 
by Cameron et al. (2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015). The conservative approach is 
warranted because of potential downward bias of the cluster-robust error estimates when the 
group size is small. Results based on wild cluster bootstrapping, a method also suggested by 
Cameron and Miller (2015), are presented in section 8.  
6. Estimated impacts on course choice 
While the popular media fixated on post-VTG enrolment increases in fitness instructor and 
other ‘soft’ courses with questionable career prospects,17 in reality there were enrolment 
increases across the board. There were indeed large increases in the number of students training 
to be fitness trainers, but there were also large enrolment increases in courses that prepare 
students for work in skill shortage occupations, such as child care workers, child care centre 
managers, electricians, plumbers, hairdressers and cooks (see Supplementary Appendix).   
Table 3 presents estimates for constant and time-varying treatment effects (equation 1 and 
2), including results under alternative counterfactual trend assumptions in the constant 
treatment effects case. The first two columns of estimates are not conditioned on observables 
and represent the overall effects of the reforms. The first column of estimates suggests that the 
VTG led to economically and statistically significant increases in the proportion of enrolments 
in courses related to skill shortage occupations of between 2.5 and 5 percentage points. The 
time-varying treatment effect estimates – which do not include state-specific trends – suggest 
the magnitude of this effect was reasonably stable over the three post-treatment years. Results 
are also consistent regardless of the counterfactual assumptions.  
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The second column of estimates for expected graduate earnings are generally positive over 
the post-reform period, although the overall magnitude and significance of the effect is 
sensitive to the choice of counterfactual trend assumption. Under standard parallel trend 
assumptions, we find initially positive impacts that become negative by year 3, with no positive 
effect overall. In contrast, under alternative counterfactual assumptions of linear diverging 
trends, we find significant positive results. Given the sensitivity of the results to counterfactual 
trend assumptions, we cannot be sure that the reform led to enrolments with higher expected 
graduate earnings on average over the post-reform period. There is also a plausible reason why 
the reforms may not have increased expected graduate earnings. Specifically, it is possible that 
increased responsiveness of enrolments associated with skill shortages in 2010 and 2011 – a 
shift right in labour supply – led to lower graduate earnings in these areas and students did not 
update their choices accordingly. This explanation is supported by analysis presented in the 
Supplementary Appendix that shows that the VTG was associated with an 8 percent fall in 
graduate earnings within skill shortage areas in 2011 (Table A6) and that the composition of 
student enrolments didn’t adjust accordingly (Table A7).18 Unlike for skill shortages, 
information on graduate earnings is not made publicly available. 
Adding controls for student and provider characteristics to the model – the second and third 
sets of results in Table 3 – makes little difference to the estimated treatment effects under either 
counterfactual trend assumption. Because it is a rich set of observable student characteristics 
being controlled for here, with no discernible effect on the estimates, it is implausible that 
compositional changes in unobservables are instead driving the estimated effects. If the overall 
VTG impact on course choice is not being driven by compositional changes on the demand or 
the supply side, then we are left with differences in information accessed by students and 
government, differences in the weight placed on the consumptive benefits of education, and 
government inertia and political economy factors as potential mechanisms. If we assume that 
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government is better informed regarding skill shortages at the national level and places a lower 
weight on the consumption benefits of education than 15-19 year old potential students, then 
government inertia and political economy factors are left as the most likely mechanisms to 
explain this positive impact of the VTG reforms on the course choice measures.  
Now turn to the question of heterogeneous treatment effects. A key motivation for 
estimating such effects is a concern that students from disadvantaged groups may suffer (or at 
least benefit less than more advantaged students) from the introduction of a voucher scheme, 
possibly because of difficulty accessing and utilising labour market information. In fact, with 
a full set of controls, groups who are commonly regarded as disadvantaged do show increases 
in the proportion of enrolments in skill shortage areas, albeit the results are not always 
statistically significant. There are no groups for whom we find a significant negative impact 
under either counterfactual trend assumption or for either course choice measure, and none of 
the estimated effects for these groups are systematically larger or smaller than the baseline 
estimates (Table 4).  
Table 4 does tentatively suggest discrepancies in course choice effects by college type, 
although conclusions in this respect are sensitive to the choice of counterfactual trend 
assumptions. These discrepancies – or more precisely the lack of discrepancies in the opposite 
direction – provide further evidence that the VTG did not primarily impact course choice 
through changes in the composition of the supply side; if anything, such compositional changes 
attenuated the overall VTG impact. For public colleges, the VTG drives an increase in the 
proportion of enrolments in skill shortage courses and an increase in expected course returns 
under both counterfactual assumptions whereas for private providers the picture is more mixed. 
Inasmuch as these estimates do show different course choice effects by college type, they are 
consistent with established public colleges exploiting their competitive advantages in 
delivering training in areas of persistent skills shortage, established over time under the 
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centrally-planned system, with private providers primarily exploiting new opportunities to 
capture public funding in other fields of student demand less closely linked to skill shortage 
areas.  
7. Estimated impacts on achievement 
Table 5 presents estimates for constant and time-varying treatment effects (equation 1 and 
2), again including results estimated under alternative counterfactual trend assumptions in the 
constant treatment effects case. For both achievement measures, all estimated constant 
treatment effects are positive, regardless of the counterfactual trend assumption, although they 
are not always statistically significant. For reasons discussed earlier, however, the following 
discussion focuses on module completion, for which the estimates are highly robust to the 
choice of counterfactual trend assumption and consistently statistically significant.  
The first set of estimates for module completion are unconditional and suggest that, under 
standard assumptions set out in Section 5, the VTG led to significant increases in completion 
rates in Victoria relative to the rest of Australia. The second set of estimates is conditional on 
student observables. As for course choice, adding individual controls makes little difference to 
the estimates, suggesting that observable compositional changes on the student side are 
unimportant in explaining impacts on academic performance. Again, it appears implausible 
that compositional changes in unobservables are instead driving the estimated effects. Adding 
provider characteristics as controls also has little impact on the estimated treatment effects (a 
slight fall in the magnitude of the estimated effect, but within conventional confidence intervals 
in each case). The final set of results adds controls for 71 fields of study categories, five course 
level categories and skill demand variables (national shortage and expected earnings at the time 
of enrolment) to (1). These also make little difference to the estimates.  
In line with the school vouchers literature, after controlling for student and college 
compositional changes and changes in course choices, the remaining effect is most plausibly 
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interpreted as being driven by improvements in the quality of VET provision associated with 
increased competition between providers. The magnitude of this module completion effect is 
also large; of roughly the same order of magnitude as the negative impact from having a 
disability at the time of enrolment. 
Note there is a marked delay in the onset of this positive completion effect – it is only really 
in the second post-reform year that the competition effect kicks in – which is consistent with 
administrative barriers or other sources of institutional inertia holding back change in response 
to the new environment on the part of incumbent providers. For example, it may take time to 
replace under-performing teaching staff or management.  
Now consider heterogeneous effects. A concern in the school voucher literature is that any 
improvement in efficiency from the introduction of an untargeted voucher comes at the expense 
of equity because of rent-seeking responses by colleges (e.g. Levin, 1991; Ladd, 2002). Table 
6 presents the estimated VTG effects for key groups and college types under both sets of 
counterfactual trend assumptions and with the full set of controls. As for the average estimates 
the focus is on the module completion results. While results in Table 5 suggest that the VTG 
leads to improved efficiency, measured by improvements in module achievement, results 
presented in Table 6 suggest no clear trade-off with equity. Significant improvements in 
module completion rates are observed for all of the identified groups commonly regarded as 
disadvantaged, and again none of the estimated effects for these groups are systematically 
larger or smaller than the baseline estimates.  
The absence of an equity-efficiency trade-off associated with the VTG contrasts with 
findings in the school vouchers literature (see Epple et al., 2015). This could reflect general 
institutional differences between sectors: unlike school, VET colleges are open access, cater 
particularly for people who are not academic high fliers, and enrolment is voluntary. But there 
are other possible explanations specific to the design of the VET voucher, including tight 
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constraints on fee increases and cream-skimming, which may have allowed the Victorian 
government to reap achievement-related benefits from greater competition without widespread 
equity-related costs. 
The VTG also drives improvement in private provider and public college module 
completion rates, although the positive effect for public colleges is only marginally significant 
in one case. A positive effect among existing colleges suggests they are upping their game in 
response to the reforms. The parallel in the schools competition literature is the positive impacts 
on achievement in existing public schools – lifting all boats – reported by Hoxby (1994; 2000; 
2003).  
8. Sensitivity analyses 
This section discusses sensitivity analyses that together help to reinforce the main 
conclusions from the preceding sections (see Table 7). Unless otherwise stated, all sensitivity 
results are estimated under standard trend assumptions using the full set of controls, consistent 
with results presented in the right-hand columns of Tables 3 and 5.19 That said, we test the 
sensitivity of results to other alternative counterfactual trend assumptions besides linear 
diverging trends, namely non-linear (quadratic). Results from these tests produce consistently 
positive and significant results across all measures, with 90% confidence intervals that are, in 
the main, overlapping with those from the standard results with full controls (from Tables 3 
and 5). 
Although there are few obvious culprits (and each is addressed below), the possibility of 
other uncontrolled-for asymmetric shocks at the state level cannot be entirely ruled out ex ante 
for any of the four outcome measures. This is less likely to be an issue, however, for the twin 
towns of Albury and Wodonga, situated on opposite banks of the Murray River on the NSW-
Victoria border, and which share a common labour market. Both towns have populations of 
around 50,000 people and both have their own public and private VET colleges, but only 
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colleges in Wodonga on the Victorian side were directly affected by the VTG. Using a similar 
difference-in-differences approach to estimate (1) for colleges operating in the local 
government areas of Albury-Wodonga again shows positive and statistically significant VTG 
impacts on all outcome measures, although the estimated magnitudes of these impacts differ 
(based on non-overlapping confidence intervals) from those estimated at the full state level. 
The relatively large impact on enrolments in skill-shortage areas may reflect the inability of 
the former centralised funding model to respond to the specific needs of local labour markets.20  
One possible candidate for an asymmetric state-level shock is the introduction of national 
requirements to be in study (school or VET) until age 17 in 2010, which may have had differing 
effects in the rest of Australia and Victoria because prior compulsory education ages were 
different across states. Most importantly, compulsory education leaving age in NSW, the most 
populous state, was 15 prior to the reform, compared to 16 in Victoria. Results in Table 7 show 
that restricting the sample to those who enrolled at 18 and 19, and who were therefore 
unaffected by the national education requirement, increases the magnitude of the positive 
effects. The reason for the stronger results without those aged 17 or under is that the 
introduction of the national education requirement reduced the number of 15 and 16 year-olds 
in VET in the rest of Australia relative to Victoria from 2010. Because young people who leave 
school at this age tend to make relatively poor course choices and perform relatively poorly, 
the reform tended to improve outcomes in the rest of Australia relative to Victoria, biasing the 
estimated effects of the VTG downwards. These suggest that our results are conservative. 
Other specific sources of potential asymmetric shocks are anticipation effects that may have 
occurred in Victoria post-announcement but pre-reform; post-reform effects that occurred in 
the second half of 2009; and the introduction of the South Australian voucher in July 2012. 
Responses that may have occurred prior to the commencement of the post-reform period are 
examined by re-estimating all models without enrolments from the time of announcement 
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(August 2008) to the end of 2009. This restriction does not impact on the estimated magnitude 
of the VTG impacts, but does reduce precision. Asymmetric shocks to the rest of Australia 
from the introduction of the South Australian voucher are examined by re-estimating without 
enrolments from July 2012. Results are much the same as without their exclusion. 
To examine whether college and course controls are adequate to deal with compositional 
changes associated with the VTG, the models for course choice are re-estimated with college 
fixed effects, and the models for achievement are re-estimated with college and course fixed 
effects. This makes little difference to the estimated VTG impacts, although adding college 
fixed effects does increase the magnitude of course choice outcomes to the point that the 
positive estimated effect for expected returns is on the cusp of statistical significance at 10%. 
This is likely to reflect disproportionate growth in the private colleges that specialise in courses 
that are unrelated to skill shortages. Conclusions remain unchanged. 
The sensitivity of the results to decisions regarding the sample is also tested. First, note that 
fee-for-service enrolments with public colleges that are not covered by the VTG, but which 
may be displaced by the VTG, are included in the analysis thus far. Results estimated with such 
enrolments excluded are reported in Table 7. Second, when estimating outcomes using the skill 
shortage measure, enrolments that are not associated with a specific occupation are omitted.  
The estimates are therefore for a smaller sample than those for the earnings-based measure. To 
test the effect of differences in the sample, the model for expected earnings is re-estimated on 
the same sample used for skill shortages. Third, for the field of study/course level combinations 
for which insufficient observations in the SOS are observed to confidently estimate an average 
wage premium, estimates are generated from more aggregated field of study/course level 
combinations. Alternatively enrolments in these courses can be dropped from the estimation of 
the wage-based measure of course choice. Results from using each of these alternative samples 
are much the same as the standard results reported in Tables 3 and 5. 
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Finally, in the models estimated thus far, inference has been based on cluster-robust standard 
errors using conservative T(G-1) critical values (Cameron et al., 2008 and Cameron and Miller, 
2015). Despite the conservative approach, however, it is still possible to over-reject the null 
hypotheses of no significant effects (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Robustness is tested 
following Cameron and Miller’s (2015) suggestion by re-estimating the significance levels of 
the main results (with full controls) using wild cluster bootstrapping with 1000 iterations. This 
method has been shown to perform well in simulation studies, including when the group size 
is less than 10 (Cameron et al., 2008). The p-values estimated from the bootstrapping are all 
significant at the 10% mark and suggest that inference based on cluster-robust standard errors 
and T(G-1) critical values is not leading to over-rejection of the null in this case.  
9. Conclusions 
This paper exploits a unique natural experiment in Australia to demonstrate for the first time 
that introducing a system-wide voucher scheme can improve the relevance and quality of post-
secondary VET. Further, by varying controls, conclusions are drawn regarding possible causal 
mechanisms. The key question that remains is the extent to which these conclusions might 
generalise to VET elsewhere and to other parts of the education sector.  
For course choice, the positive treatment effect shows that linking funding to student 
choices, rather than centralised government allocations, led to a better alignment of enrolments 
with skill demands, as defined by enrolments that prepare students for jobs on national skill 
shortage lists. For employers, the improved enrolment responsiveness to skill shortages 
reduced the cost of employing new graduates in these occupations. However, the extent to 
which students responded to changes in course graduate earnings, an alternative signal of skill 
demand, is unclear because the significance and magnitude of the results depend on the 
underlying counterfactual trend assumption. The weaker student response to the latest course 
graduate earnings compared to the latest skill shortages, regardless of the trend assumption, is 
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not surprising given that information on the former is not publicly available. This result 
underlines the need for the public release of up-to-date information on course-specific returns 
to complement government skill shortage information. 
Whilst there is no guarantee that the same positive course choice impacts would be 
replicated elsewhere – these may have been unusually well-informed students, or the Victorian 
government at the time may have made unusually poor allocation decisions pre-reform – the 
fact that other Australian states and other English-speaking countries with shared VET-sector 
characteristics also share dissatisfaction with existing funding models on the grounds of 
training relevance suggests Victoria is not uniquely able to benefit from a broad-based VET 
voucher, particularly where students are also given access to relevant information on course-
specific returns.  
The paper also shows that membership of a disadvantaged group does not affect one’s ability 
to benefit from greater agency to select preferred post-secondary courses afforded under a 
voucher. This contrasts with literature that suggests students from disadvantaged groups benefit 
less from school choice reforms because of an inability to access and assess school performance 
information (Levin, 1991; Ladd, 2002; Hastings and Weinstein, 2008). One explanation is that 
when choosing post-secondary VET courses, students from disadvantaged groups may be less 
encumbered by resource constraints and parental attitudes, and may link course choice more 
closely to their future job prospects than when choosing schools. It may also be that labour 
market information is more equally available (or unavailable) than information on school 
quality. The extent to which this particular conclusion might generalise beyond Australian VET 
is unclear, but we at least have new evidence that leads us to question the extent to which the 
earlier conclusions regarding the equity costs of school choice reforms generalise to other 
educational contexts.   
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For achievement, increased competition between providers is the channel most consistent 
with the estimated positive reform impacts, which are observed across both new private 
providers and incumbent public providers; competition raises all VET boats. A further 
contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that these achievement gains, like the course choice 
gains, do not come at a cost to equity; in contrast to findings by Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and 
others, this paper shows that under conditions where there is little student selection, academic 
achievement gains are widespread, including among disadvantaged groups. To the extent that 
this reflects potentially replicable regulations that constrain cream-skimming and fee caps, then 
the findings highlight the potential role of such safeguards in realising the competition benefits 
of broad-based vouchers without the equity costs. 
There are of course many caveats to bear in mind when drawing these conclusions. It is 
possible that students make better course choices according to the two measures here, but 
would not do so according to some alternative measure forecasting ahead to future labour 
market needs, where governments plausibly have a greater informational advantage. It is also 
possible that the improvements in student achievement reflect a form of grade inflation (or 
more precisely competency inflation) rather than any real improvement in skills, given that 
across Australia (and in other countries) it is the colleges themselves that are responsible for 
assessment. (This would in itself be an interesting result, but not necessarily one that 
governments would want to replicate). If nothing else, however, the regime in place for external 
moderation of assessments, coupled with the fact that course-level completion data were not 
made systematically available at the time, make us question this as an explanation. Third, the 
conclusions are based on just three post-reform cohorts, each followed for a maximum of two 
years, and there is reason to suspect – from the estimates presented here and from the wider 
literature – that the early impacts of such reforms may differ from longer run impacts.  
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The narrative around these reforms turned rapidly negative in Victoria in the absence of 
credible evidence on their impacts at the time and given the budgetary implications of the rapid 
growth in enrolment. This led to the partial roll-back of the reforms in July 2012, which this 
paper shows may have been a mistake. Looking forward, this paper can potentially support 
governments to design, implement and sustain wholesale changes, perhaps against the wishes 
of incumbent providers and in the face of hostile media coverage. 
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Table 1: New post-secondary VET course enrolments of 15-19 year olds 
 Victoria Rest of Australia 
 
Public  
college 
Private  
college Total 
Public  
college 
Private  
college Total 
       
2006 52,861 9,454 62,315 130,722 22,267 152,989 
2007 53,218 8,304 61,522 133,225 21,752 154,977 
2008 53,774 6,811 60,585 118,351 23,650 142,001 
2009 54,773 7,406 62,179 130,233 30,485 160,718 
2010 60,711 16,766 77,477 127,716 36,233 163,949 
2011 58,667 30,632 89,299 126,736 39,266 166,002 
2012 82,411 33,604 116,015 129,976 35,191 165,167 
       
Avg. annual 2006-09 53,657 7,994 61,650 128,133 24,539 152,671 
Avg. annual 2010-12 67,263 27,001 94,264 128,143 36,897 165,039 
Difference  13,607 19,007 32,613 10 12,358 12,368 
Note: Public colleges include Technical and Further Education (TAFE) colleges, Adult and Community Education (ACE) colleges and 
Universities. Private colleges include professional/industry organisations, other non-government organisations and for-profit training 
colleges. These estimates exclude enrolments among those who are still in secondary school. 
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Table 2: Mean characteristics of 15-19 year-old new post-secondary VET course 
enrolments, pre and post reform 
 Victoria Rest of Australia 
 2006-09 2010-12 2006-09 2010-12 
     
Outcomes     
National Skill Shortage enrolments (%) 18.3  13.0  22.8  15.1  
Expected graduate earnings (log earnings, $A2013)a -0.13  -0.11  -0.11  -0.09  
Course completion (%) 23.2  29.5  28.8  31.5  
Module completion (%) 73.3  78.3  76.3  76.6  
     
Controls     
State (%)     
Victoria 100 100   
NSW - - 41.1 39.2 
Queensland - - 26.2 27.3 
Western Australia - - 15.2 16.3 
South Australia - - 9.8 10.6 
Tasmania - - 4.2 3.9 
Australian Capital Territory - - 2.1 1.5 
Northern Territory - - 1.4 1.2 
Year of course commencement (%)     
2006 25.3 0 25.1 0 
2007 24.9 0 25.4 0 
2008 24.6 0 23.3 0 
2009 25.2 0 26.3 0 
2010 0 27.4 0 33.1 
2011 0 31.6 0 33.5 
2012 0 41 0 33.4 
Month of course commencement (%)     
January 25.6 10.8 10.5 8.6 
February 37.4 33.3 42.7 37.6 
March 4 7.3 6.1 7 
April 3.6 5.8 4.1 4.5 
May 3.2 5.9 4 4.9 
June 2.7 7.2 3.1 3.6 
July 13.9 11.3 17.9 19.7 
August 3 5.3 3.7 4.8 
September 1.9 4 2.6 2.9 
October 2.6 4.3 2.6 3.2 
November 1.4 3.5 1.9 2.3 
December 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.9 
Interstate residential address  (%)b 2.7 2 1.7 1.8 
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Residential unemployment rate (local government area 
%)c 5.0 5.5 4.8 5.6 
     
Student characteristicsd     
Student is female (%) 43.6 43.8 44.3 42.7 
Age in years on January 1 in the year of enrolment (%)     
15 7.3 4.9 8.1 7.4 
16 12.4 10.5 15.1 14.4 
17 20.8 20.2 26.2 26.3 
18 35 36.5 29.1 29.4 
19 24.5 27.9 21.6 22.6 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (%) 6 3.6 15.7 16.3 
Migrant status and language spoken at home     
Doesn't speaks a language other than English at home, 
Australian born 50.4 59.2 56.3 67.5 
Speaks a language other than English at home, 
Australian born 2.3 3.3 3.1 4.2 
Doesn't speak a language other than English at home, 
foreign born 32.8 28.2 26.5 17.2 
Speaks a language other than English at home, foreign 
born 9.5 8.2 6.9 5 
Regional classification of residence (%)     
Major city 68.7 72.7 64.7 63.4 
Inner regional 25.8 22.5 20.8 21.6 
Outer regional 5.4 4.7 11.3 11.9 
Remote 0.1 0.1 2.1 2 
Very remote 0 0 1.1 1.1 
Employed at time of enrolment (%) 58.1 56.2 58.5 52.1 
Has a disability (%) 6.6 7.6 5.6 6.9 
Socio-economic status of residential area (%)     
1st quintile (most disadvantaged nationally) 4.3 4.2 11.5 11.9 
2nd quintile 14 12.5 12.5 13 
3rd quintile 18 16.9 18.4 19.1 
4th quintile 31.2 34.6 27.6 27.8 
5th quintile (most advantaged nationally) 32.5 31.7 30 28.2 
Highest prior level of education completed (%)     
Tertiary education (ISCED 4B and above) 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 
Secondary school (ISCED 3A) or vocational equiv. 
(ISCED 3C) 51.3 53.5 46.2 44.3 
Less than secondary qualification 48.3 45.8 53.2 54.9 
     
College characteristicsd     
Number of enrolments in 2008 (%)     
Provider didn't exist  0.6 12.9 4.2 11.3 
<100 enrolments 9.1 12.7 7.3 7.9 
100-999 enrolments 10.7 10.8 12.4 13.4 
1000-3999 enrolments 31.7 24.9 22.2 21.5 
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4000-6999 enrolments 39.9 32.5 31.2 27.7 
7000+ enrolments 8 6.2 22.5 18.2 
Type of college (%)     
Public Technical and Further Education (TAFE) 71.7 57.4 80.5 74.5 
Public Adult Centre for Education (ACE) 7.4 7.7 3.3 3.1 
Public University 8 6.2 0.1 0.1 
Private industry, professional association or non-
government organisation  5.5 6 3.7 3.6 
Private for profit 6.6 22.1 9.9 13.6 
Private other 0.9 0.5 2.5 5.1 
     
Course characteristicsd     
Course qualification level (%)     
Certificate of attainment 0.2 1.8 0.3 1.9 
Certificate I 8.3 11.4 8 7.9 
Certificate II 26.4 24.7 22.4 25.9 
Certificate III 35.3 37.8 46.7 44.2 
Certificate IV 12 12 11.7 11.5 
Diploma+ 17.8 12.4 11 8.5 
Field of study (ASCED 2-digit, %)e     
Natural and physical science 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Information technology 3.4 1.8 3.9 3.4 
Engineering and related technology 17 14.2 20.2 19.3 
Architecture and building 9.7 10.1 8.9 10.5 
Agriculture, environment and related 3.6 2.7 3.8 4 
Health 2.8 3.1 2.4 3.1 
Education 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 
Management and commerce 25.3 22.2 23.7 20.9 
Society and culture 8.5 11.4 9.7 10.7 
Creative arts 4.3 4 4.5 4.8 
Food, hospitality and personal services 15.1 14.3 14.1 12.7 
Mixed programs/general coursesf 9.6 15.7 7.7 9.6 
National skill shortageg 16.5 10.8 21.1 13.4 
Expected graduate earnings (log earnings, $A2013)h -0.13  -0.11  -0.11  -0.09  
Count 246,601 282,791 610,685 495,118 
Estimates are based on the full set of information available for each variable. None of the variables have more than 5% missing. These 
estimates exclude enrolments among those who are still in secondary school. This data includes information on multiple enrolments by the 
same individuals within a given year. 
a This is relative to estimated earnings from graduates in certificate III Building,, a  qualification undertaken as part of a building 
apprenticeship. bIdentified as people whose state of residential address is different to their state in which they enrolled in study. cLocal 
government area is the geographic boundary of municipal governments similar to a county. The data is published by the Australian 
Department of Employment. dFor more information on the definition of these variables, see Table A1 of supplementary appendix. 
eInformation on field of study is presented in this table at a more aggregate level (2-digit Australian Standard Classification of Education 
(ASCED)) than is used in the analysis (4-digit ASCED) to save space. fGeneral courses are ones that are not preparation for a specific 
occupation, such as numeracy and literacy courses and employment skills training. gBinary indicator for whether course of enrolment is 
associated with preparation for work in an occupation that is on the national skill shortage list at the start of the year of enrolment. When 
used as a control in course completion models, mixed field and general courses that do not prepare students for a particular course are coded 
0. hOnly used as a control in course completion models.
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates for course choice, 2010-12  
 Unconditional With individual controls With individual and provider controls 
  
National skill 
shortage 
Expected 
graduate earnings 
National skill 
shortage 
Expected 
graduate earnings 
National skill 
shortage 
Expected 
graduate earnings 
       
Standard counterfactual assumptionsa       
Constant treatment effect (2010-12) 0.025*** 0.003 0.023*** 0.006 0.021** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Time-varying treatment effect       
2010 0.030*** 0.017** 0.025*** 0.018** 0.023** 0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2011 0.020** 0.022* 0.022*** 0.027** 0.021** 0.024* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
2012 0.025** -0.024*** 0.022** -0.021*** 0.020** -0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
       
Alternative counterfactual assumptionsb       
Constant treatment effect (2010-12) 0.050** 0.033*** 0.044** 0.035*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 
       
Count 1,462,223 1,596,394 1,457,328 1,591,001 1,456,904 1,590,552 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. All models are estimated using all 
available information. The sample size for results using the National Skill Shortage measure are smaller because we exclude enrolments in general courses that do not prepare people for any specific course.  
aCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to follow a parallel path to those of the Rest of Australia. bCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to diverge relative to the Rest of Australia at the same 
constant rate present prior to the reform (2006-09).  
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Table 4: Heterogeneous difference-in-differences coefficient estimates for course choice, 2010-12, constant treatment effects with 
individual and course controls 
 Sub-sample Standard counterfactual assumptionsa  Alternative counterfactual assumptions
b 
  Skill shortage 
 Expected  
graduate earnings   Skill shortage 
 Expected  
graduate earnings 
      
Female 0.003 0.006  0.026** 0.034** 
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.011) (0.010) 
Disability 0.025* 0.026**  0.036*** 0.045** 
 (0.012) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.014) 
Speaks a language other than English at home 0.039** 0.009  0.040** 0.039** 
 (0.015) (0.008)  (0.016) (0.012) 
Reside in a suburb whose socio-economic status (SEIFA) is in the 
lowest quintile nationally 
0.038* -0.008 
 
0.026 -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.013)  (0.024) (0.014) 
Lives outside a capital city 0.017* -0.005  0.033* 0.019 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.015) (0.013) 
Less than secondary school qualification 0.008 -0.006  0.033** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.012) (0.009) 
Unemployed 0.025*** -0.000  0.049*** 0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.010) 
Public college 0.044*** 0.015  0.048*** 0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Private for profit college -0.037 0.006  0.047 0.038*** 
 (0.051) (0.005)  (0.103) (0.007) 
      
Overall 0.025*** 0.003  0.047*** 0.033*** 
  (0.006) (0.006)   (0.013) (0.008) 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. All models are estimated using all 
available information.  
aCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to follow a parallel path to those of the Rest of Australia. bCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to diverge relative to the Rest of Australia at the same 
constant rate present prior to the reform (2006-09). 
 39 
 
Table 5: Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates for course completion, 2010-2012 
 
Unconditional With individual controls 
With individual and provider 
controls 
With individual, provider and 
course controls 
  
Module 
completion 
Course 
completion 
Module 
completion 
Course 
completion 
Module 
completion 
Course 
completion 
Module 
completion 
Course 
completion 
         
Standard counterfactual assumptionsa         
Constant treatment effect (2010-12) 0.034*** 0.038* 0.031** 0.029 0.022** 0.01 0.031*** 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) 
Time-varying treatment effect         
2010 0.020* 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.011 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) 
2011 0.036*** 0.050* 0.036** 0.039 0.022* 0.009 0.035*** 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) 
2012 0.043*** 0.044** 0.040*** 0.035* 0.031** 0.016 0.042*** 0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
         
Alternative counterfactual assumptionsb         
Constant treatment effect (2010-12) 0.039*** 0.067*** 0.031*** 0.061*** 0.021** 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
         
Count 1,596,937 1,635,195 1,591,528 1,629,707 1,591,080 1,629,237 1,591,080 1,629,237 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. All models are estimated using all 
available information. The sample size for results using the National Skill Shortage measure are smaller because we exclude enrolments in general courses that do not prepare people for any specific course.      
aCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to follow a parallel path to those of the Rest of Australia. bCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to diverge relative to the Rest of Australia at the same 
constant rate present prior to the reform (2006-09).
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Table 6: Heterogeneous difference-in-differences coefficient estimates for course completion, 2010-2012, constant treatment effects with 
individual, provider and course controls 
Sub-sample Standard counterfactual assumptionsa  Alternative counterfactual assumptions
b 
 Module completion  Course completion   Module completion  Course completion  
      
Female 0.016* 0.017  0.024*** 0.056*** 
 (0.008) (0.016)  (0.005) (0.013) 
Disability 0.002 0.008  0.028** 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.011) 
Speaks a language other than English at home 0.028** -0.011  0.042*** 0.063*** 
 (0.011) (0.012)  (0.007) (0.010) 
From lowest quintile of national SES measure (SEIFA) 0.030*** 0.033*  0.049*** 0.065** 
 (0.008) (0.016)  (0.006) (0.022) 
Lives outside a capital city 0.033*** -0.002  0.022** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.007) 
Less than secondary school qualification 0.027** 0.008  0.026** 0.031* 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.015) 
Unemployed 0.009 -0.016  0.034** 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.011) 
Public college 0.024** -0.011  0.015 0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.007) 
Private for profit business 0.035*** 0.046**  0.075*** -0.013 
 (0.007) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.051) 
      
Overall 0.031*** 0.011  0.026*** 0.041*** 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.010) 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. All models are estimated using all 
available information.  
 aCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to follow a parallel path to those of the Rest of Australia. bCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to diverge relative to the Rest of Australia at the same 
constant rate present prior to the reform (2006-09).
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Table 7: Results for the sensitivity analysis, 2010-2012, under standard counterfactual 
trend assumptionsa and constant treatment effects with full set of controls 
  Course choice Course completion 
  
National 
skill 
shortage 
Expected  
graduate 
earnings 
Module 
completion 
Course 
completion 
   
  
Standard estimates (Tables 3 and 5) 0.021** 0.004 0.031*** 0.011 
s.e.  (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
CI lower 90% 0.009 -0.007 0.015 -0.010 
CI upper 90% 0.034 0.016 0.046 0.033 
Parallel quadratic growth assumptions  0.043** 0.042*** 0.017** 0.025* 
s.e.  (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
CI lower 90% 0.017 0.026 0.007 0.003 
CI upper 90% 0.068 0.057 0.027 0.047 
Enrolments restricted to Albury and Wodonga local 
government areasb 
0.145*** 0.046*** 0.060*** 0.107*** 
s.e.  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
CI lower 90% 0.138 0.042 0.053 0.100 
CI upper 90% 0.152 0.050 0.067 0.115 
Restrict to 18-19 year-olds 0.034** 0.010* 0.036*** 0.024* 
s.e.  (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) 
CI lower 90% 0.014 0.000 0.022 0.001 
CI upper 90% 0.054 0.020 0.049 0.047 
Omit enrolments from August 2008 to December 
2009 
0.018** 0.005 0.025** 0.005 
s.e.  (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
CI lower 90% 0.004 -0.006 0.006 -0.020 
CI upper 90% 0.032 0.016 0.045 0.029 
Omit enrolments from July 2012 0.019** 0.008 0.029** 0.012 
s.e.  (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) 
CI lower 90% 0.007 -0.002 0.013 -0.013 
CI upper 90% 0.031 0.018 0.046 0.037 
Include college fixed effects 0.036*** 0.012 - - 
s.e.  (0.003) (0.007) - - 
CI lower 90% 0.030 -0.001 - - 
CI upper 90% 0.042 0.025 - - 
Include college and provider fixed effects - - 0.020** 0.021 
s.e.  - - (0.006) (0.012) 
CI lower 90% - - 0.009 -0.001 
CI upper 90% - - 0.032 0.043 
Excluding fee-for-service courses 0.017** 0.003 0.037*** 0.016 
s.e.  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
CI lower 90% 0.004 -0.01 0.021 -0.005 
CI upper 90% 0.029 0.015 0.053 0.037 
Excluding courses not linked to an occupation - -0.003 - - 
s.e.  - -0.005 - - 
CI lower 90% - -0.011 - - 
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CI upper 90% - 0.006 - - 
Excluding expected wages with missing 4-digit cells - 0.001 - - 
s.e.  - (0.007) - - 
CI lower 90%  -0.011   
CI upper 90%  0.014   
Wild bootstrapped standard errors 0.21*** 0.004 0.031* 0.012 
s.e.  (0.000) (0.007) (0.017) (0.013) 
CI lower 90% 0.021 -0.008 0.003 -0.01 
CI upper 90% 0.021 0.016 0.059 0.033 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Unless otherwise stated, results are generated with a full set of student 
and college controls with state cluster-robust standard errors and critical values from T(8-1) distribution. 
 aCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to follow a parallel path to those of the Rest of Australia.bLocal government areas 
(LGAs) is an Australian standard geographical classification that covers the administrative boundaries of local governments, similar to 
counties in the United States. The LGAs of Albury (in Victoria) and Wodonga (in NSW) are divided by the Murray River, which is the 
Victoria and NSW state border. This model is estimated on a sample size of 1962 and 3073 observations for national skill shortage and 
course graduate wage respectively. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state level with T(2-1) critical values.  cWe use the 
cgmwildboot program (provided by Judson Caskey, https://sites.google.com/site/judsoncaskey/data) to estimate p-values based on wild 
bootsrapped standard errors clustered at the state and territory level with 1000 draws. The program produces p-values (reported in square 
brackets) that are based on empirical T(8-1) distribution.  
 
 
 
 43 
 
Endnotes 
1 Two recent examples of reforms are The Skills for Sustainable Growth reforms introduced in England in 
2012/13 and the Educating Tomorrow’s Workforce Act 2015 in the US. The former aimed to provide greater 
contestability between VET colleges for public funding by granting 19-24 year-olds an entitlement to a 
government-funded place in training for basic level courses, which they could use to enrol in any course of their 
choosing. The latter attempted to make community college enrolments more responsive to local skill needs by 
linking annual federal funding allocations to measures of how closely course offerings are aligned to locally-
identified skill needs. 
2 See OECD (2010) and OECD (2014) for ambitious attempts at such comparisons.  
3 Most media reports pointed to large increases in enrolment in specific courses in areas outside of skill shortage 
areas, such as health and fitness training, as evidence that the reforms were not working, but ignored growth in 
enrolments in areas that were in skill need, such as aged care and child care. Examples of these negative reports 
are: ‘Market design fails to supply the skills’, Australian Financial Review, 3 July 2012; ‘Match training to 
needs: business’, Australian Financial Review, 3 July 2012; ‘Free market could limit skills: TAFE’, The 
Australian, 12 January 2012. 
4 In 2008, Victoria was close to an election year (2010). Its centre-left government had been in office for almost 
ten years and its long-serving Premier resigned for personal reasons in July 2007. Faced with flagging political 
fortunes after a long term in office and slowing economic growth, the new Premier John Bracks took over with 
the intention of re-invigorating the party in the run-up to the 2010 election. Renewed commitment to education 
was a central focus and it was these political interests that were the key driver of Victoria’s early adoption of the 
national reforms. 
5 The voucher schemes introduced in other states were much more limited than the VTG. Essentially, 
enrolments under the other state voucher schemes were limited to courses on government priority lists.  
6 In 2008, 27% of Victorians aged 15-19 in publicly-funded courses were undertaking apprenticeships or 
traineeships (National VET Provider Collection).  
7 In July 2012, the Victorian government partially unwound the 2009 reforms by making course subsidies more 
targeted towards perceived employer demand for graduates. 
8 In practice, direct tuition fees were regulated according to course level in each state, with a prescribed hourly 
rate and a minimum and maximum total annual fee. In Victoria, hourly fees for lower-level courses (certificates 
I and II, equivalent to ISCED2) were up to $1.51 per hour in 2011, with a minimum total fee of $187.50 and a 
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maximum total fee of $875. The highest fees were for Diploma level courses – up to $3.79 per hour, minimum 
total fee of $375 and a maximum total fee of $2000. Many students were also eligible for reduced fees, e.g. on 
the grounds of receiving Income Support (welfare).  
9 Relevant requirements for registration include to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate people with 
disability (under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992), and to adopt policies and approaches aimed at ensuring 
VET colleges respond to the individual needs of clients whose age, gender, cultural or ethnic background, 
disability, sexuality, language skills, literacy or numeracy level, unemployment, imprisonment or remote location 
may present a barrier to access, participation and the achievement of suitable outcomes.  
10 LSAY 2003 tracks the cohort of 15 year-old students who participated in the OECD Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) in 2003 (around 10,000 students) annually until age 25. Fee-for-service estimates in 
private colleges are estimated as the share of 17-19 year-old school leavers/graduates in 2005-07 who enrol in 
non-government colleges, excluding apprentices and trainees because they are all entitled to a publicly-funded 
place in training. This is likely to be an over-estimate because prior to reform private colleges were also able to 
tender for small-scale public training contracts, such as training programs for public sector employees. 
11 These occupations are at the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupation (ANZSCO) 
6-digit level. There are 998 ANZSCO 6-digit occupations in all. Skill shortage lists are compiled by the 
Department of Employment: https://www.employment.gov.au/skill-shortages. 
12 Grogger and Eide (1995) and Avery and Turner (2012), for example, do something similar to estimate returns 
to different college majors in the US. Where there are sparse cells, results estimated with course level and 2-
digit field of study combinations are used. Field of study is 4-digit Australian Standard Classification of 
Education (ASCED). 
13 See http://www.ncver.edu.au/sos for further details on the SOS. 
14 Earnings data are reported in bands from which this analysis uses the midpoint. 
15 See supplementary material for tests of diverging pre-reform trends. 
16 Implemented by introducing state-specific trend terms coded -3, -2,…,2, 3 corresponding to the years 2006 to 
2012 respectively. 
17 Match Training to Needs: Business. The Australian Financial Review (3/7/2012). 
18 The reduction in graduate earnings in 2011 is estimated using conditional difference-in-difference analysis 
using SOS graduate earnings data. The lack of response to the fall in 2011 earnings in skills shortage areas in 
2012 is demonstrated by re-estimating unconditional difference-in-difference models under standard 
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counterfactual assumptions (equation 1) with expected graduate earnings fixed at 2010 levels for students 
enrolling in 2012. Under this scenario, the result in 2012 is much more positive and statistically significant 
(Table A7). 
19 We have also estimated the same sensitivity tests under alternative trend assumptions (diverging linear 
trends). Results from these tests produce the same conclusions, that is, results are not sensitive to alternative 
model specifications — treatment effects have the same sign and statistical significance as under the standard 
model specification (see Table A8 from the supplementary material). 
20 The Albury-Wodonga economy is not typical of Australian inland towns that usually rely heavily on 
agriculture. A legacy of decentralisation policies in the 1970s and its history as a transport hub, the Albury-
Wodonga economy depends heavily on manufacturing and business services that require workers with trade, 
engineering and other technical training. However, twenty-five consecutive years of economic growth in 
Australia has led to skill shortages in many of skill areas and inland towns far from capital cities, such as 
Albury-Wodonga, have struggled to attract the required skilled workers (see Cameron 2011 for an overview of 
prevailing skill shortage problems in inland Australian towns). Albury-Wodonga is situated on the main 
highway joining the two largest capital cities in Australia, Sydney and Melbourne. It is 553km south of Sydney 
and 325km north of Melbourne. The towns were formed in the 1830s on opposite banks of the river to 
accommodate the transportation of goods between the two main Australian colonies and as customs houses to 
collect duties on goods travelling between the two colonies.  
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Course Choice and Achievement Effects of a  
System-wide Vocational Education and Training Voucher Scheme for 
Young People: Supplementary Material 
 
Table A1 defines the control variables included in (1) in the main paper. Table A2 provides 
further descriptive information on the national skills shortage lists behind one of the course 
choice measures. Table A3 gives the estimated wage premia associated with different 
qualifications that lie behind the second course choice measure in the main paper. Table A4 
provides estimates from tests for pre-reform diverging trends for all outcomes on the pre-
reform sample. Table A5 shows courses that experience the largest average post-reform 
enrolment growth — those with more than 500 extra enrolments per annum. Table A6 presents 
the key results from analysis using the Student Outcome Survey that show the impact of the 
VTG on graduate wages in skill shortage areas. The results presented in Table A7 are from 
equation (2) in the main paper with course demand information associated with 2012 
enrolments restricted to that faced by students enrolled in 2011. Tables A8 are results for the 
sensitivity tests presented in Table 7, except with linear time trends. 
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Table A1: Description of control variables 
Variable Description 
  
Student characteristics 
 
Female Dummy variable of gender  
Age in years on January 1 in the year of enrolment Dummy variable derived from the date of birth. To be eligible for the VTG, course applicants must 
provide evidence to verify their date of birth 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Self-identified as being from Aboriginal or Torres Strait Island decent 
Migrant status and language spoken at home Migrant status is self-reported country of birth, which is collapsed into whether or not the student is 
born overseas. Language other than English spoken at home is the reported main language spoken 
at home other than English (if any). All languages other than English are bundled together as non-
English speaking. 
Regional classification of residence These are categories of remoteness, measured by distance to major services, produced by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2011a). These categories were assigned to the residential 
postcodes in the VETPC using correspondence between residential postcode and remoteness areas 
obtained from the ABS.  
Employed at time of enrolment Students are asked which of a number of employment states best describes their current situation. 
Our binary measure of employed includes people who report being part-time employed, full-time 
employed and self-employed. All other states (unpaid worker, unemployed and looking for work 
and unemployed and not seeking work) are grouped together. 
Has a disability Student self-reported belief about whether they have a disability, impairment or long-term health 
condition. This information is used by colleges to identify students who may need extra support to 
cater for any special learning needs. 
Socio-economic status of residential area This is the relative disadvantage of the local government area (LGA) in which the student resides, 
measured using the Social Economic Index of Areas (SEIFA) produced by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (2011b). SEIFA is an ordinal index of regional disadvantage, combining measures such as 
percentage of people who are low income and percentage of people who have less than secondary 
school education from the Australian census. We break the national index into quintiles, where the 
lowest quintile contains the most disadvantaged postcodes in Australia. The SEIFA quintiles were 
assigned to students in the VETPC using concordance between postcode and LGA obtained from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
Highest prior level of education completed Highest prior education is a combination of information on the student reported highest year of 
school successfully completed and the reported Australian Standard Classification of Education 
 48 
 
(ASCED) post-school qualifications completed. The highest post-school qualification is determined 
according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997 (United National 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 2006) qualification rankings and 
concordance between ASCED and ISCED (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001).  
  
College characteristics 
 
Number of enrolments in 2008 Number of 15-19 year-old new enrolments in 2008 for each college identified in VETPC between 
2008 and 2011. New colleges that entered the market after 2008 are treated as a separate category. 
Type of college College type in the VETPC is classified according to the governance characteristics of the 
organisation providing the training. Technical and Further Education (TAFE) colleges are the main 
public colleges, which were created by Act of Parliament and have responsibilities specified in their 
establishing Acts, other legislation and Ministerial Directions. Adult and Community Education 
(ACE) colleges are also public colleges. They differ from TAFEs in that their primary focus is adult 
education and as well as providing nationally accredited courses for preparation for work, they also 
provide personal and recreational courses (that are not included in this study). The third type of 
public college is dual sector universities that offer both VET qualifications and bachelor degrees. In 
contrast to public colleges, private businesses (commercial colleges) are registered colleges that 
provide nationally recognised training on a for-profit basis. In between public and private 
businesses are enterprises, industry associations and other non-government organisations that are 
registered training organisations that provide nationally accredited training to meet the needs of 
their members or employees.  
  
Course characteristics 
 
Course qualification level Under the Australian Qualification Framework (AQF) (Australian Quality Framework Council 
2013), nationally accredited VET courses are one of six ASCED levels from Certificate I through 
to Advanced Diploma. For the analysis, we combine Diploma level courses and Advanced Diploma 
level courses to produce five qualification categories. These are equivalent to ISCED (1997) 2C 
through to ISCED 5B (ABS 2001). There are also a small number of low level VET courses outside 
the AQF system that are termed certificates of attainment.  
Field of study (4-digit ASCED) The field of course study is at the 4-digit Australian Standard Classification of Education level 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001). There are 71 categories in total. 
National skill shortage indicator Binary measure of whether the course is associated with preparation for work in a skill shortage 
occupation. Skill shortage occupations are those that at the start of the year of enrolment are listed 
by the Department of Education to be of national shortage. General courses of mixed field courses 
that are not associated with preparation for a particular occupation are coded zero. We also include 
a binary indicator for these courses.  
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Expected graduate earnings This is identical to the dependent variable for course choice and represents the estimated log 
earnings premium (A$2013) for graduates for different field of study and course level 
combinations, relative to Building certificate level III. See the data description in section 3 for more 
information and Table A3 for the estimated earnings premia. 
 50 
 
Table A2: Occupations on the National Skill Shortage List, 2006-2012a 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
         
Construction Project Manager 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Engineering Manager 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Production Manager (Mining) 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Child Care Centre Manager 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Accountant (General) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Management Accountant 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Taxation Accountant 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
External Auditor 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Architect 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Surveyor 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Urban and Regional Planner 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Chemical Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Civil Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Quantity Surveyor 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Structural Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Transport Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Electrical Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Electronics Engineer 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Mechanical Engineer 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 5 
Production or Plant Engineer 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Mining Engineer (excluding Petroleum) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Petroleum Engineer 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 5 
Agricultural Consultant 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Agricultural Scientist 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Forester (Aus) / Forest Scientist (NZ) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Geologist 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Veterinarian 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Metallurgist 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Early Childhood (Pre-primary School) Teacher 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Special Needs Teacher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Medical Diagnostic Radiographer 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Medical Radiation Therapist 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Nuclear Medicine Technologist 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sonographer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Optometrist 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Hospital Pharmacist 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Retail Pharmacist 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Dental Specialist 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Dentist 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Occupational Therapist 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Physiotherapist 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Podiatrist 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
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Audiologist 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
Speech Pathologist (Aus) / Speech Language 
Therapist (NZ) 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
Midwife 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Nurse Educator 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Nurse Researcher 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nurse Manager 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Nurse Practitioner 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Aged Care) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Child and Family Health) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Community Health) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Critical Care and Emergency) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Developmental Disability) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Disability and Rehabilitation) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Medical) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Medical Practice) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Mental Health) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Perioperative) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurse (Surgical) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Registered Nurses nec 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Clinical Psychologist 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Social Worker 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Welfare Worker 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Agricultural Technician 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Architectural Draftsperson 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Building Associate 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Construction Estimator 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Surveying or Cartographic Technician 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Civil Engineering Draftsperson 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Civil Engineering Technician 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Electrical Engineering Draftsperson 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Electrical Engineering Technician 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Electronic Engineering Draftsperson 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Electronic Engineering Technician 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Mechanical Engineering Draftsperson 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Metallurgical or Materials Technician 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Mine Deputy 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Radiocommunications Technician 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Automotive Electrician 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Diesel Motor Mechanic 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Motorcycle Mechanic 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Small Engine Mechanic 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Sheetmetal Trades Worker 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Metal Fabricator 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Welder (First Class) (Aus) / Welder (NZ) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
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Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (Avionics) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (Mechanical) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Fitter (General) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Fitter and Turner 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Fitter-Welder 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Metal Machinist (First Class) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Mechanic 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Metal Fitters and Machinists nec 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Locksmith 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Toolmaker 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 
Panelbeater 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Vehicle Body Builder 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Vehicle Trimmer 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Vehicle Painter 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Bricklayer 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 
Stonemason 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Carpenter and Joiner 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Carpenter 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Joiner 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Floor Finisher 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Painting Trades Worker 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Glazier 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Fibrous Plasterer 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Solid Plasterer 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Roof Tiler 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Wall and Floor Tiler 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Plumber (General) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Airconditioning and Mechanical Services 
Plumber 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Drainer (Aus) / Drainlayer (NZ) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Gasfitter 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Roof Plumber 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 6 
Electrician (General) 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Electrician (Special Class) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lift Mechanic 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Airconditioning and Refrigeration Mechanic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Electrical Linesworker (Aus) / Electrical Line 
Mechanic (NZ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Electronic Equipment Trades Worker 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
Electronic Instrument Trades Worker (General) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Cabler (Data and Telecommunications) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Telecommunications Cable Jointer 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Telecommunications Linesworker (Aus) / 
Telecommunications Line Mechanic (NZ) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Telecommunications Technician 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Baker 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
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Pastrycook 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Butcher or Smallgoods Maker 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Chef 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Cook 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Shearer 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 
Arborist 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Landscape Gardener 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Hairdresser 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Binder and Finisher 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Screen Printer 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Graphic Pre-press Trades Worker 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Printing Machinist 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Small Offset Printer 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Upholsterer 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Cabinetmaker 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Furniture Finisher 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5 
Picture Framer 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Wood Machinist 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Boat Builder and Repairer 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Jeweller 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Signwriter 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Optical Dispenser (Aus) / Dispensing Optician 
(NZ) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Dental Technician 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 
Enrolled Nurse 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Child Care Worker 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Miner 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Total 107 114 135 135 77 94 94 756 
Information on skill demand, including national shortage information used in the analysis is annual information from the year prior to 
enrolment (2005-2011). This is the best estimate of information available at the time course choice. Not on list does not necessarily mean that 
there is weak demand for course graduates trained for work in a given occupation. Occupations in the table (out of a total 998 occupations) 
are those that appear on the national skill shortage list at least once over the period of analysis.  Occupations not on the national shortage list 
may be regionally, but not nationally, in shortage. In some cases, occupations may not be in the list because there is no evidence available on 
the extent of the skill shortage.  
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Table A3: Estimated log weekly wage coefficients ($A2013) by ISCED 4-digit field of 
study and qualification level  
ISCED 4-digit field of study Level 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
         
Accounting Cert. I 
-
0.09 0.04 0.05 0.46 
-
0.01 0.01 
-
0.03 
Accounting Cert. II 0.02 
-
0.02 
-
0.04 
-
0.07 0.04 0.11 
-
0.06 
Accounting Cert. III 0.13 0.51 
-
0.46 0.52 0.10 
-
0.11 
-
0.15 
Accounting Cert. IV 
-
0.24 
-
0.13 
-
0.24 
-
0.20 
-
0.20 
-
0.20 
-
0.27 
Accounting Diploma+ 
-
0.06 
-
0.29 
-
0.28 
-
0.37 
-
0.29 
-
0.33 
-
0.25 
Aerospace Engineering and Technology Cert. I 
-
0.31 
-
0.66 0.14 0.19 
-
0.15 
-
0.28 
-
0.09 
Aerospace Engineering and Technology Cert. II 0.22 
-
0.59 0.07 
-
0.10 0.00 
-
0.20 
-
0.24 
Aerospace Engineering and Technology Cert. III 0.04 
-
0.04 
-
0.01 
-
0.05 
-
0.03 0.00 0.01 
Aerospace Engineering and Technology Cert. IV 
-
0.04 
-
0.67 
-
0.36 
-
0.56 
-
0.50 
-
0.32 
-
0.19 
Aerospace Engineering and Technology Diploma+ 
-
0.08 
-
0.18 
-
0.54 
-
0.35 
-
0.21 
-
0.14 
-
0.14 
Agriculture Cert. I 0.08 0.06 
-
0.21 
-
0.09 
-
0.08 
-
0.35 
-
0.15 
Agriculture Cert. II 
-
0.03 
-
0.22 
-
0.31 
-
0.19 
-
0.20 
-
0.07 
-
0.20 
Agriculture Cert. III 
-
0.08 
-
0.20 
-
0.20 
-
0.19 
-
0.20 
-
0.35 0.00 
Agriculture Cert. IV 
-
0.08 
-
0.32 
-
0.12 
-
0.09 
-
0.20 
-
0.20 
-
0.24 
Agriculture Diploma+ 
-
0.30 
-
0.15 
-
0.30 
-
0.04 
-
0.27 
-
0.64 
-
0.44 
Architecture and Urban Environment Cert. I 0.18 
-
0.05 
-
0.10 
-
0.11 
-
0.24 
-
0.12 
-
0.18 
Architecture and Urban Environment Cert. II 0.11 
-
0.23 0.00 
-
0.43 
-
0.35 
-
0.12 
-
0.22 
Architecture and Urban Environment Cert. III - - - - - - - 
Architecture and Urban Environment Cert. IV 
-
0.21 
-
0.31 
-
0.24 
-
0.35 
-
0.25 
-
0.30 
-
0.16 
Architecture and Urban Environment Diploma+ 
-
0.11 
-
0.26 
-
0.15 
-
0.18 
-
0.18 
-
0.16 
-
0.21 
Automotive Engineering and Technology Cert. I 0.03 
-
0.13 0.05 
-
0.17 
-
0.47 
-
0.04 0.03 
Automotive Engineering and Technology Cert. II 
-
0.07 
-
0.57 
-
0.14 
-
0.12 
-
0.16 0.30 0.24 
Automotive Engineering and Technology Cert. III 
-
0.05 
-
0.15 
-
0.08 
-
0.17 
-
0.12 
-
0.10 
-
0.09 
Automotive Engineering and Technology Cert. IV 
-
0.13 
-
0.16 
-
0.14 
-
0.22 
-
0.22 
-
0.21 
-
0.16 
Automotive Engineering and Technology Diploma+ 
-
0.12 
-
0.28 
-
0.18 
-
0.31 
-
0.20 
-
0.27 
-
0.20 
Banking, Finance and Related Fields Cert. I 0.05 
-
0.13 
-
0.01 
-
0.08 
-
0.11 
-
0.08 
-
0.08 
Banking, Finance and Related Fields Cert. II 
-
0.11 
-
0.10 0.01 0.04 0.03 
-
0.01 
-
0.06 
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Banking, Finance and Related Fields Cert. III 0.06 
-
0.05 
-
0.07 
-
0.13 
-
0.12 0.06 
-
0.08 
Banking, Finance and Related Fields Cert. IV 
-
0.04 
-
0.15 0.00 
-
0.28 
-
0.67 0.11 
-
0.54 
Banking, Finance and Related Fields Diploma+ 
-
0.06 
-
0.29 
-
0.28 
-
0.37 
-
0.29 
-
0.33 
-
0.25 
Biological Sciences Cert. I 0.40 
-
0.14 
-
0.19 0.01 0.14 
-
0.20 
-
0.02 
Biological Sciences Cert. II 0.05 
-
0.32 
-
0.14 
-
0.29 0.47 0.07 0.23 
Biological Sciences Cert. III 
-
0.18 
-
0.46 
-
0.09 
-
0.06 
-
0.04 0.01 0.02 
Biological Sciences Cert. IV - - 
-
0.92 - 
-
0.62 
-
0.27 - 
Biological Sciences Diploma+ - - - - - - - 
Building Cert. I 0.02 0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.02 
-
0.08 0.05 0.00 
Building Cert. II 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.15 
Building (reference case) Cert. III 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Building Cert. IV 
-
0.22 
-
0.32 
-
0.25 
-
0.36 
-
0.27 
-
0.31 
-
0.17 
Building Diploma+ 
-
0.12 
-
0.27 
-
0.15 
-
0.19 
-
0.19 
-
0.17 
-
0.22 
Business and Management Cert. I 0.11 0.05 0.06 
-
0.05 0.00 0.04 
-
0.02 
Business and Management Cert. II 0.03 0.00 
-
0.06 
-
0.11 
-
0.03 
-
0.10 
-
0.08 
Business and Management Cert. III 0.07 
-
0.02 
-
0.06 
-
0.22 
-
0.12 
-
0.16 
-
0.16 
Business and Management Cert. IV 0.06 
-
0.35 
-
1.04 
-
0.51 
-
0.61 
-
0.11 
-
0.27 
Business and Management Diploma+ 
-
0.35 
-
0.93 0.14 
-
0.31 
-
0.29 
-
0.33 
-
0.25 
Civil Engineering Cert. I 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.12 
-
0.06 
-
0.03 
Civil Engineering Cert. II 
-
0.03 0.46 0.04 
-
0.12 
-
0.09 0.13 0.01 
Civil Engineering Cert. III 0.03 
-
0.51 
-
0.08 0.03 
-
0.20 
-
0.31 
-
0.08 
Civil Engineering Cert. IV 0.16 
-
0.13 0.28 0.60 
-
0.18 0.05 
-
0.24 
Civil Engineering Diploma+ 0.56 
-
0.18 
-
0.12 0.09 
-
0.21 
-
0.14 
-
0.14 
Communication and Media Studies Cert. I 0.24 
-
0.14 
-
0.06 
-
0.13 
-
0.22 
-
0.10 
-
0.36 
Communication and Media Studies Cert. II 
-
0.11 
-
0.23 
-
0.28 
-
0.26 
-
0.35 
-
0.32 
-
0.34 
Communication and Media Studies Cert. III 
-
0.30 
-
0.17 
-
0.35 
-
0.13 
-
0.19 
-
0.14 
-
0.45 
Communication and Media Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.08 
-
0.94 
-
0.58 
-
0.19 
-
0.19 
-
0.46 
-
0.66 
Communication and Media Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.89 
-
0.15 
-
0.17 
-
0.40 0.52 
-
0.89 
-
0.95 
Complementary Therapies Cert. I 
-
0.10 0.04 
-
0.21 
-
0.18 
-
0.07 
-
0.18 
-
0.08 
Complementary Therapies Cert. II 
-
0.10 
-
0.58 
-
0.24 
-
0.09 
-
0.20 
-
0.16 
-
0.02 
Complementary Therapies Cert. III 0.03 0.02 
-
0.06 
-
0.07 
-
0.13 0.04 
-
0.02 
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Complementary Therapies Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.26 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Complementary Therapies Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Computer Science Cert. I 0.03 
-
0.04 
-
0.10 
-
0.13 
-
0.12 
-
0.22 
-
0.05 
Computer Science Cert. II 0.13 
-
0.29 0.03 
-
0.49 
-
0.19 
-
0.15 
-
0.21 
Computer Science Cert. III 
-
0.32 
-
0.26 
-
0.44 
-
0.64 
-
0.45 
-
0.13 
-
0.07 
Computer Science Cert. IV 
-
0.18 
-
0.31 
-
0.24 
-
0.27 
-
0.51 0.09 0.53 
Computer Science Diploma+ - - 
-
0.55 
-
0.29 - - - 
Curriculum and Education Studies Cert. I 
-
0.29 0.04 
-
0.12 - 
-
0.63 0.70 0.25 
Curriculum and Education Studies Cert. II 0.12 0.12 0.11 
-
0.08 0.06 0.15 0.06 
Curriculum and Education Studies Cert. III 
-
0.01 0.79 0.01 
-
0.12 
-
0.13 
-
0.81 
-
0.73 
Curriculum and Education Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.46 - 0.75 - 
-
0.25 - 
-
0.29 
Curriculum and Education Studies Diploma+ - - 
-
0.30 - 
-
0.01 
-
0.72 
-
0.60 
Dental Studies Cert. I 
-
0.40 0.17 0.38 
-
0.11 0.17 
-
0.14 0.02 
Dental Studies Cert. II 0.30 
-
0.15 0.00 
-
0.01 
-
0.01 
-
0.04 
-
0.10 
Dental Studies Cert. III 0.02 0.00 
-
0.05 
-
0.11 
-
0.13 0.09 
-
0.01 
Dental Studies Cert. IV 0.26 
-
0.26 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Dental Studies Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68  
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Earth Sciences Cert. I 0.29 
-
0.22 0.36 
-
0.04 
-
1.02 0.02 
-
0.02 
Earth Sciences Cert. II 0.10 
-
0.30 
-
0.07 
-
0.29 
-
2.11 0.64 
-
0.11 
Earth Sciences Cert. III 0.74 
-
0.43 
-
0.24 
-
0.06 
-
0.04 0.01 
-
0.17 
Earth Sciences Cert. IV - - 
-
0.92 - 
-
0.62 
-
0.27 - 
Earth Sciences Diploma+ - - - - - - - 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering and 
Technology Cert. I 0.07 
-
0.16 
-
0.07 
-
0.06 0.00 0.04 0.07 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering and 
Technology Cert. II 0.33 0.13 0.32 0.59 0.23 0.40 0.03 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering and 
Technology Cert. III 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.15 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering and 
Technology Cert. IV 
-
0.12 
-
0.29 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.13 
-
0.36 
-
0.27 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering and 
Technology Diploma+ 
-
0.22 
-
0.32 
-
0.17 
-
0.44 
-
0.28 
-
0.13 0.05 
Employment Skills Programmes Cert. I - 
-
0.51 
-
0.26 
-
0.49 
-
0.61 
-
0.13 
-
0.16 
Employment Skills Programmes Cert. II 0.07 
-
0.32 
-
0.52 0.13 0.52 0.06 
-
0.29 
Employment Skills Programmes Cert. III 
-
0.11 1.47 0.25 0.06 
-
0.38 
-
0.48 
-
0.02 
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Employment Skills Programmes Cert. IV 
-
0.24 
-
0.14 
-
0.27 
-
0.45 
-
0.18 
-
0.33 
-
0.15 
Employment Skills Programmes Diploma+ 
-
0.17 
-
0.31 
-
0.54 
-
0.25 
-
0.27 
-
0.17 
-
0.25 
Environmental Studies Cert. I 0.07 
-
0.05 
-
0.08 0.29 0.13 
-
0.15 0.13 
Environmental Studies Cert. II 
-
0.25 
-
0.16 
-
0.09 
-
0.22 
-
0.07 
-
0.10 
-
0.13 
Environmental Studies Cert. III 0.08 
-
0.42 
-
0.13 
-
0.01 0.01 
-
0.23 
-
0.12 
Environmental Studies Cert. IV 0.03 
-
0.10 
-
0.15 
-
0.65 
-
0.11 
-
0.19 
-
0.26 
Environmental Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.04 
-
0.44 0.05 
-
0.75 
-
0.37 
-
0.29 
-
0.50 
Fisheries Studies Cert. I 
-
0.32 0.01 
-
1.15 
-
0.03 
-
0.12 
-
0.31 
-
0.40 
Fisheries Studies Cert. II 
-
0.07 
-
0.17 
-
0.27 
-
0.35 
-
0.35 
-
0.04 
-
0.08 
Fisheries Studies Cert. III 0.09 
-
0.21 
-
0.11 0.54 
-
0.37 
-
0.19 0.06 
Fisheries Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.40 
-
0.27 
-
0.35 
-
0.31 
-
0.32 
-
0.45 
-
0.03 
Fisheries Studies Diploma+ 0.26 
-
0.27 
-
0.50 0.01 0.18 0.28 
-
0.46 
Food and Hospitality Cert. I 0.22 
-
0.07 
-
0.11 0.21 0.03 0.29 0.03 
Food and Hospitality Cert. II 0.06 
-
0.11 
-
0.07 
-
0.18 
-
0.02 
-
0.14 
-
0.03 
Food and Hospitality Cert. III 0.06 
-
0.06 
-
0.10 
-
0.12 
-
0.13 
-
0.10 
-
0.14 
Food and Hospitality Cert. IV 
-
0.08 
-
0.12 
-
0.11 
-
0.26 
-
0.21 
-
0.13 
-
0.19 
Food and Hospitality Diploma+ 
-
0.01 
-
0.06 
-
0.19 
-
0.14 
-
0.32 
-
0.04 
-
0.24 
Forestry Studies Cert. I 0.03 0.01 
-
0.22 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.31 
-
0.12 
Forestry Studies Cert. II 
-
0.07 0.09 
-
0.27 
-
0.17 
-
0.19 0.06 
-
0.03 
Forestry Studies Cert. III 0.09 0.15 0.07 
-
0.18 
-
0.08 
-
0.10 0.21 
Forestry Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.05 
-
0.18 0.15 0.14 0.14 
-
0.14 
-
0.09 
Forestry Studies Diploma+ 0.46 
-
0.41 
-
0.37 
-
0.14 
-
0.23 
-
0.29 
-
0.46 
General Education Programmes Cert. I - 
-
0.49 
-
0.25 
-
0.49 0.09 0.76 
-
0.28 
General Education Programmes Cert. II 0.05 
-
0.46 
-
0.32 
-
0.25 
-
0.28 
-
0.05 
-
0.30 
General Education Programmes Cert. III 
-
0.08 
-
0.44 
-
0.14 
-
0.13 
-
0.14 
-
0.11 
-
0.16 
General Education Programmes Cert. IV 0.02 
-
0.11 0.00 
-
0.11 
-
0.24 
-
0.08 
-
0.28 
General Education Programmes Diploma+ 
-
0.32 
-
0.50 
-
0.19 
-
0.46 
-
0.23 
-
0.33 
-
0.08 
Geomatic Engineering Cert. I 0.19 0.48 0.44 
-
0.11 0.15 0.13 0.20 
Geomatic Engineering Cert. II 
-
0.17 
-
0.07 0.04 
-
0.12 1.00 
-
0.79 
-
0.40 
Geomatic Engineering Cert. III 0.10 
-
0.04 0.26 
-
0.63 
-
0.27 
-
0.27 0.16 
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Geomatic Engineering Cert. IV 0.30 
-
0.13 
-
0.02 
-
1.65 
-
0.56 
-
0.67 0.18 
Geomatic Engineering Diploma+ 
-
0.08 
-
0.18 
-
0.12 
-
0.35 
-
0.21 
-
0.14 
-
0.14 
Graphic and Design Studies Cert. I 0.00 
-
0.09 
-
0.10 
-
0.16 
-
0.22 
-
0.05 
-
0.21 
Graphic and Design Studies Cert. II 
-
0.10 
-
0.02 
-
0.28 
-
0.21 
-
0.24 
-
0.29 
-
0.28 
Graphic and Design Studies Cert. III 
-
0.17 
-
0.18 
-
0.31 
-
0.41 
-
0.41 
-
0.03 
-
0.38 
Graphic and Design Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.02 
-
0.08 
-
0.37 
-
0.24 
-
0.71 
-
0.38 
-
0.47 
Graphic and Design Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.89 
-
0.15 
-
0.17 
-
0.40 0.52 
-
0.89 
-
0.73 
Horticulture and Viticulture Cert. I 
-
0.01 0.05 
-
0.13 
-
0.25 
-
0.02 
-
0.37 
-
0.11 
Horticulture and Viticulture Cert. II 
-
0.04 0.03 
-
0.42 0.12 
-
0.35 0.10 
-
0.06 
Horticulture and Viticulture Cert. III 0.02 
-
0.26 
-
0.15 
-
0.32 
-
0.14 
-
0.15 
-
0.19 
Horticulture and Viticulture Cert. IV 
-
0.08 
-
0.26 
-
0.14 
-
0.27 
-
0.17 
-
0.26 
-
0.19 
Horticulture and Viticulture Diploma+ 
-
0.19 
-
0.59 
-
0.51 
-
0.31 
-
0.54 0.30 
-
0.60 
Human Welfare Studies and Services Cert. I 0.02 
-
0.04 
-
0.02 
-
0.18 
-
0.02 
-
0.03 
-
0.06 
Human Welfare Studies and Services Cert. II 
-
0.01 
-
0.18 0.01 
-
0.27 0.09 
-
0.06 
-
0.04 
Human Welfare Studies and Services Cert. III 0.05 
-
0.12 0.03 
-
0.08 
-
0.03 
-
0.02 
-
0.05 
Human Welfare Studies and Services Cert. IV 
-
0.18 0.20 
-
0.92 
-
0.22 
-
0.29 
-
0.05 
-
0.38 
Human Welfare Studies and Services Diploma+ 
-
0.15 
-
0.20 
-
0.05 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.05 0.34 
Information Systems Cert. I 0.10 
-
0.16 
-
0.07 
-
0.14 
-
0.06 
-
0.02 
-
0.01 
Information Systems Cert. II 0.00 
-
0.19 
-
0.19 
-
0.11 0.04 
-
0.09 
-
0.16 
Information Systems Cert. III 0.08 
-
0.25 
-
0.27 
-
0.26 
-
0.21 
-
0.25 
-
0.28 
Information Systems Cert. IV 
-
0.04 
-
0.10 
-
0.26 
-
0.24 
-
0.03 
-
0.08 0.45 
Information Systems Diploma+ - - 
-
0.56 
-
0.31 - - - 
Justice and Law Enforcement Cert. I 0.07 
-
0.14 0.04 
-
0.12 
-
0.09 0.03 
-
0.22 
Justice and Law Enforcement Cert. II 0.06 
-
0.15 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.06 
-
0.06 
Justice and Law Enforcement Cert. III 0.05 
-
0.16 0.02 0.03 
-
0.22 
-
0.10 0.06 
Justice and Law Enforcement Cert. IV 
-
0.18 0.07 0.40 0.75 0.49 
-
0.05 
-
0.31 
Justice and Law Enforcement Diploma+ 
-
0.15 
-
0.20 
-
0.05 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.05 0.34 
Language and Literature Cert. I 
-
0.22 0.14 0.18 
-
0.47 
-
0.41 0.17 0.16 
Language and Literature Cert. II 
-
0.45 
-
0.52 0.02 0.22 
-
0.05 
-
0.05 
-
0.65 
Language and Literature Cert. III 
-
0.28 
-
0.25 
-
0.14 
-
0.08 
-
0.10 0.14 
-
0.18 
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Language and Literature Cert. IV 0.03 0.06 
-
0.08 
-
0.11 0.00 0.23 0.00 
Language and Literature Diploma+ 
-
0.04 
-
0.18 0.02 
-
0.21 
-
0.26 0.11 0.33 
Law Cert. I 0.38 0.16 0.01 
-
0.34 0.04 0.06 
-
0.10 
Law Cert. II 
-
0.06 
-
0.12 
-
0.16 
-
0.56 
-
0.18 0.02 
-
0.07 
Law Cert. III 0.03 
-
0.11 
-
0.01 
-
0.08 
-
0.05 
-
0.03 
-
0.08 
Law Cert. IV 
-
0.18 0.07 
-
0.17 
-
0.22 
-
0.16 
-
0.05 
-
0.31 
Law Diploma+ 
-
0.15 
-
0.20 
-
0.05 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.05 0.34 
Librarianship, Information Management 
and Curatorial Studies Cert. I 0.23 
-
0.11 0.03 0.06 
-
0.08 0.01 0.14 
Librarianship, Information Management 
and Curatorial Studies Cert. II 0.34 
-
0.12 
-
0.33 
-
0.20 0.03 
-
0.02 
-
0.24 
Librarianship, Information Management 
and Curatorial Studies Cert. III 0.03 
-
0.06 
-
0.54 
-
0.14 
-
0.24 0.24 
-
0.33 
Librarianship, Information Management 
and Curatorial Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.13 
-
0.80 
-
0.22 
-
0.18 0.06 
-
0.57 
-
0.31 
Librarianship, Information Management 
and Curatorial Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.15 
-
0.20 
-
0.05 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.05 0.34 
Manufacturing Engineering and 
Technology Cert. I 0.00 
-
0.18 0.09 
-
0.12 
-
0.23 
-
0.08 0.13 
Manufacturing Engineering and 
Technology Cert. II 
-
0.09 
-
0.30 
-
0.17 
-
0.42 
-
0.04 0.12 0.03 
Manufacturing Engineering and 
Technology Cert. III 
-
0.11 
-
0.23 
-
0.20 
-
0.27 
-
0.17 
-
0.11 
-
0.21 
Manufacturing Engineering and 
Technology Cert. IV 0.02 
-
0.06 
-
0.21 
-
0.35 
-
0.52 
-
0.19 
-
0.29 
Manufacturing Engineering and 
Technology Diploma+ 
-
0.07 
-
0.35 
-
0.09 
-
0.59 
-
0.06 
-
0.10 
-
0.15 
Maritime Engineering and Technology Cert. I 0.03 
-
0.13 0.05 
-
0.02 0.08 
-
0.04 
-
1.34 
Maritime Engineering and Technology Cert. II 0.43 
-
0.07 0.08 
-
0.12 0.31 0.40 0.78 
Maritime Engineering and Technology Cert. III 0.09 0.14 0.09 
-
0.20 
-
0.15 0.00 0.12 
Maritime Engineering and Technology Cert. IV 0.27 0.08 
-
0.05 0.02 0.01 
-
0.20 
-
0.03 
Maritime Engineering and Technology Diploma+ 0.15 
-
0.28 
-
0.16 
-
0.31 
-
0.42 
-
0.06 0.00 
Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
and Technology Cert. I 0.03 0.16 
-
0.12 0.22 0.01 
-
0.11 0.05 
Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
and Technology Cert. II 0.26 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.23 0.15 
Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
and Technology Cert. III 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.09 
Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
and Technology Cert. IV 
-
0.11 
-
0.22 
-
0.06 
-
0.26 
-
0.20 
-
0.19 
-
0.21 
Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
and Technology Diploma+ 
-
0.06 0.07 
-
0.04 
-
0.19 
-
0.20 
-
0.13 
-
0.15 
Medical Studies Cert. I 
-
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
-
0.23 0.06 0.06 
Medical Studies Cert. II 
-
0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.12 
Medical Studies Cert. III 0.03 0.02 
-
0.06 
-
0.07 
-
0.13 0.04 
-
0.02 
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Medical Studies Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.26 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Medical Studies Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Nursing Cert. I 0.33 
-
0.06 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 
Nursing Cert. II 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.17 
Nursing Cert. III 
-
0.55 0.02 1.03 
-
0.07 
-
0.13 0.04 
-
0.23 
Nursing Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.13 
-
0.31 
-
0.45 
-
0.50 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Nursing Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Office Studies Cert. I 0.09 0.04 0.05 
-
0.03 
-
0.01 0.01 
-
0.03 
Office Studies Cert. II 0.21 
-
0.02 
-
0.04 
-
0.07 
-
0.03 
-
0.07 0.32 
Office Studies Cert. III 0.00 
-
0.13 
-
0.11 
-
0.17 
-
0.17 
-
0.15 
-
0.15 
Office Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.03 
-
0.14 
-
0.10 
-
0.25 
-
0.20 
-
0.22 
-
0.28 
Office Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.03 
-
0.23 
-
0.24 
-
0.40 
-
0.30 
-
0.38 
-
0.23 
Optical Science Cert. I 
-
0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.06 
Optical Science Cert. II 0.25 0.38 
-
0.02 
-
0.02 0.29 0.11 0.09 
Optical Science Cert. III 0.03 0.02 
-
0.06 
-
0.07 
-
0.47 0.04 
-
0.02 
Optical Science Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.26 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Optical Science Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Other Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies Cert. I 0.03 0.01 
-
0.18 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.31 
-
0.12 
Other Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies Cert. II 
-
0.07 
-
0.17 
-
0.27 
-
0.17 
-
0.19 
-
0.04 
-
0.16 
Other Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies Cert. III 
-
0.07 
-
0.03 0.07 
-
0.24 0.32 
-
0.51 
-
0.19 
Other Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.49 
-
0.73 
-
0.40 
-
0.34 
-
0.33 
-
0.13 
-
1.19 
Other Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.10 
-
0.42 
-
0.37 
-
0.14 
-
0.23 
-
0.29 
-
0.46 
Other Creative Arts Cert. I 0.39 
-
0.13 
-
0.42 
-
0.18 
-
0.22 
-
0.14 
-
0.26 
Other Creative Arts Cert. II 
-
0.19 
-
0.38 
-
0.77 
-
0.12 
-
1.55 
-
0.51 
-
0.31 
Other Creative Arts Cert. III 
-
0.06 
-
0.16 
-
0.24 
-
0.15 
-
0.29 
-
0.18 
-
0.37 
Other Creative Arts Cert. IV 
-
0.48 
-
0.46 
-
0.16 0.51 0.66 
-
0.70 
-
0.47 
Other Creative Arts Diploma+ 
-
0.89 
-
0.15 
-
0.17 
-
0.40 0.52 
-
0.89 
-
0.73 
Other Education Cert. I 
-
0.29 
-
0.98 
-
0.12 - 
-
0.88 0.70 0.24 
Other Education Cert. II 0.17 0.16 0.11 
-
0.09 0.10 0.16 0.08 
Other Education Cert. III 
-
0.04 0.08 0.15 
-
0.27 
-
0.32 
-
0.48 
-
0.25 
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Other Education Cert. IV 
-
0.46 - 0.75 - 
-
0.25 - 
-
0.29 
Other Education Diploma+ - - 
-
0.31 - 0.07 
-
0.96 - 
Other Engineering and Related 
Technologies Cert. I 
-
0.10 
-
0.19 0.06 0.29 
-
0.11 
-
0.04 
-
0.36 
Other Engineering and Related 
Technologies Cert. II 
-
0.28 
-
0.47 0.13 0.40 0.13 0.25 0.20 
Other Engineering and Related 
Technologies Cert. III 0.29 0.00 
-
0.08 
-
0.41 
-
0.27 
-
0.16 
-
0.04 
Other Engineering and Related 
Technologies Cert. IV 0.04 0.18 0.26 
-
0.29 
-
0.05 0.00 
-
0.20 
Other Engineering and Related 
Technologies Diploma+ 1.00 
-
0.18 
-
0.12 
-
0.35 
-
0.21 
-
0.14 
-
0.14 
Other Health Cert. I 
-
0.05 
-
0.24 0.04 
-
0.31 
-
0.15 0.06 
-
0.20 
Other Health Cert. II 
-
0.75 0.07 0.22 0.06 
-
0.12 
-
0.34 
-
0.13 
Other Health Cert. III 0.09 
-
0.01 0.06 0.16 
-
0.16 0.04 0.03 
Other Health Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.26 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Other Health Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Other Information Technology Cert. I 0.10 
-
0.88 0.16 0.11 
-
0.10 
-
0.78 
-
0.07 
Other Information Technology Cert. II 
-
0.17 0.02 0.11 
-
0.23 
-
0.33 
-
0.21 0.15 
Other Information Technology Cert. III 
-
0.08 
-
0.24 
-
0.35 
-
0.34 
-
0.25 
-
0.22 
-
0.27 
Other Information Technology Cert. IV 
-
0.25 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.23 
-
0.47 
-
0.57 0.56 
Other Information Technology Diploma+ - - 
-
0.55 
-
0.29 - - - 
Other Management and Commerce Cert. I 0.44 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 0.45 0.06 0.04 0.59 
Other Management and Commerce Cert. II 0.02 
-
0.02 
-
0.04 
-
0.07 
-
0.35 
-
0.11 
-
0.09 
Other Management and Commerce Cert. III 
-
0.04 
-
0.07 
-
0.06 
-
0.12 
-
0.09 
-
0.10 
-
0.15 
Other Management and Commerce Cert. IV 
-
0.04 
-
0.07 
-
0.06 
-
0.06 
-
0.27 0.63 
-
0.27 
Other Management and Commerce Diploma+ 0.08 
-
1.44 
-
2.40 0.15 
-
0.29 
-
0.48 0.28 
Other Mixed Field Programmes Cert. I - 
-
0.49 
-
0.25 
-
0.48 
-
0.23 0.17 0.38 
Other Mixed Field Programmes Cert. II 0.07 
-
0.44 
-
0.30 
-
0.23 
-
0.26 0.69 0.54 
Other Mixed Field Programmes Cert. III 0.22 
-
0.11 
-
0.29 
-
0.09 
-
0.56 
-
0.17 
-
0.13 
Other Mixed Field Programmes Cert. IV 
-
0.04 
-
0.03 0.01 
-
0.23 
-
0.12 0.49 
-
0.14 
Other Mixed Field Programmes Diploma+ 
-
0.25 
-
0.39 
-
1.81 
-
0.27 
-
0.45 
-
0.82 
-
0.21 
Other Natural and Physical Sciences Cert. I 0.29 
-
0.63 
-
0.23 
-
0.08 
-
0.11 0.12 
-
0.02 
Other Natural and Physical Sciences Cert. II 0.25 
-
0.30 
-
0.07 
-
0.31 
-
0.15 
-
0.04 
-
0.31 
Other Natural and Physical Sciences Cert. III 0.31 
-
0.36 0.06 
-
0.08 
-
0.06 0.00 0.02 
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Other Natural and Physical Sciences Cert. IV - - 
-
0.94 - 
-
0.64 
-
0.28 - 
Other Natural and Physical Sciences Diploma+ - - - - - - - 
Other Society and Culture Cert. I 0.04 
-
0.05 0.00 
-
0.15 
-
0.03 0.00 
-
0.10 
Other Society and Culture Cert. II 
-
0.06 
-
0.12 
-
0.03 
-
0.20 0.01 
-
0.02 
-
0.07 
Other Society and Culture Cert. III 0.42 0.05 
-
0.25 0.00 
-
0.05 
-
0.03 
-
0.08 
Other Society and Culture Cert. IV 0.03 0.30 0.11 
-
0.10 
-
0.16 
-
0.05 
-
0.31 
Other Society and Culture Diploma+ 
-
0.15 
-
0.20 0.53 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.05 0.34 
Performing Arts Cert. I 
-
0.06 
-
0.24 
-
0.07 
-
0.19 
-
0.22 
-
0.11 
-
0.33 
Performing Arts Cert. II 
-
0.43 
-
0.78 
-
0.20 
-
0.13 
-
0.31 
-
0.31 
-
0.37 
Performing Arts Cert. III 
-
0.06 
-
0.19 
-
0.16 
-
0.10 
-
0.25 
-
0.30 
-
0.34 
Performing Arts Cert. IV 
-
0.20 
-
0.47 
-
0.25 
-
0.07 
-
0.27 
-
0.37 
-
0.53 
Performing Arts Diploma+ 
-
0.97 
-
1.09 
-
0.04 
-
0.45 0.52 
-
0.49 
-
0.73 
Personal Services Cert. I 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.28 0.03 
Personal Services Cert. II 0.12 
-
0.32 0.02 
-
0.16 
-
0.17 
-
0.25 
-
0.21 
Personal Services Cert. III 
-
0.08 
-
0.18 
-
0.20 
-
0.22 
-
0.19 
-
0.17 
-
0.20 
Personal Services Cert. IV 
-
0.16 
-
0.24 
-
0.22 
-
0.32 
-
0.29 
-
0.19 
-
0.31 
Personal Services Diploma+ 0.54 0.34 
-
0.54 
-
0.77 
-
0.05 
-
0.04 
-
0.24 
Political Science and Policy Studies Cert. I 0.04 0.40 0.50 
-
0.15 
-
0.03 0.00 
-
0.10 
Political Science and Policy Studies Cert. II 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.28 0.05 0.10 0.07 
Political Science and Policy Studies Cert. III 0.03 0.67 
-
0.12 
-
0.49 
-
0.04 
-
0.22 
-
0.04 
Political Science and Policy Studies Cert. IV 
-
0.01 
-
0.01 
-
0.71 0.14 
-
0.16 
-
0.05 
-
0.31 
Political Science and Policy Studies Diploma+ 
-
0.15 
-
0.20 
-
0.05 
-
0.29 
-
0.36 
-
0.05 0.34 
Process and Resources Engineering Cert. I 0.25 
-
0.46 0.21 
-
0.20 0.26 
-
0.03 
-
0.24 
Process and Resources Engineering Cert. II 
-
0.03 
-
0.09 0.36 
-
0.12 0.31 
-
0.09 0.14 
Process and Resources Engineering Cert. III 0.04 
-
0.01 
-
0.01 
-
0.07 
-
0.06 0.11 
-
0.01 
Process and Resources Engineering Cert. IV 0.35 0.43 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.11 
Process and Resources Engineering Diploma+ 0.04 
-
0.04 0.14 
-
0.47 
-
0.10 0.06 
-
0.11 
Public Health Cert. I 
-
0.32 
-
0.20 
-
0.31 0.03 0.29 0.42 0.34 
Public Health Cert. II 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09 
-
0.02 0.21 
Public Health Cert. III 0.24 0.25 
-
0.10 
-
0.09 0.12 
-
0.10 0.14 
Public Health Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.58 
-
0.09 
-
0.11 0.26 
-
0.22 
-
0.23 
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Public Health Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Rehabilitation Therapies Cert. I 
-
0.12 
-
0.21 
-
0.20 0.26 0.22 
-
0.91 
-
0.07 
Rehabilitation Therapies Cert. II 0.31 0.23 
-
0.49 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Rehabilitation Therapies Cert. III 0.03 1.01 
-
0.06 
-
0.07 
-
0.13 0.04 
-
0.02 
Rehabilitation Therapies Cert. IV 0.05 
-
0.26 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
-
0.05 
-
0.16 
-
0.26 
Rehabilitation Therapies Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.68 - 
-
0.30 
-
0.12 
-
0.24 
-
0.31 
Sales and Marketing Cert. I 
-
0.01 0.03 0.01 
-
0.06 0.00 
-
0.09 
-
0.03 
Sales and Marketing Cert. II 0.08 0.01 
-
0.05 
-
0.07 
-
0.07 
-
0.06 
-
0.12 
Sales and Marketing Cert. III 0.02 
-
0.10 
-
0.14 
-
0.20 
-
0.19 
-
0.13 
-
0.13 
Sales and Marketing Cert. IV 
-
0.07 
-
0.20 
-
0.14 
-
0.33 
-
0.23 
-
0.22 
-
0.27 
Sales and Marketing Diploma+ 
-
0.10 
-
0.25 
-
0.42 
-
0.45 
-
0.34 
-
0.21 
-
0.50 
Social Skills Programmes Cert. I - 
-
0.49 
-
0.25 
-
0.48 
-
0.30 0.17 
-
0.13 
Social Skills Programmes Cert. II 0.07 
-
0.44 0.00 
-
1.08 
-
0.26 
-
0.02 
-
0.29 
Social Skills Programmes Cert. III 0.68 0.28 0.36 
-
0.11 
-
0.17 
-
0.17 
-
0.13 
Social Skills Programmes Cert. IV 
-
0.42 0.49 
-
0.11 
-
0.23 0.03 
-
0.19 0.11 
Social Skills Programmes Diploma+ 
-
1.76 
-
0.39 
-
0.61 
-
0.20 0.30 0.16 
-
0.67 
Sport and Recreation Cert. I 0.09 
-
0.23 
-
0.02 
-
0.10 
-
0.11 0.05 
-
0.15 
Sport and Recreation Cert. II 
-
0.09 0.04 
-
0.11 
-
0.27 
-
0.11 
-
0.03 
-
0.09 
Sport and Recreation Cert. III 
-
0.06 
-
0.08 
-
0.11 
-
0.19 
-
0.13 
-
0.15 
-
0.15 
Sport and Recreation Cert. IV 
-
0.29 0.03 
-
0.25 
-
0.49 
-
0.33 
-
0.17 
-
0.65 
Sport and Recreation Diploma+ 
-
0.45 
-
0.33 
-
0.24 
-
0.83 
-
0.59 
-
1.17 0.34 
Teacher Education Cert. I 
-
0.30 0.54 
-
0.11 - 
-
0.14 0.68 0.25 
Teacher Education Cert. II 
-
0.13 
-
0.16 0.08 
-
0.10 
-
0.10 0.10 0.01 
Teacher Education Cert. III 
-
0.15 
-
0.60 
-
0.06 
-
0.10 0.06 0.06 
-
0.03 
Teacher Education Cert. IV 
-
0.49 - 0.74 - 
-
0.26 - 
-
0.30 
Teacher Education Diploma+ - - 
-
0.30 - 
-
0.09 
-
0.58 
-
0.85 
Tourism Cert. I 0.09 0.04 0.97 
-
0.03 
-
0.01 
-
0.62 
-
0.03 
Tourism Cert. II 
-
0.29 
-
0.02 
-
0.05 
-
0.89 
-
0.37 0.23 
-
0.03 
Tourism Cert. III 0.05 
-
0.03 
-
0.13 
-
0.13 
-
0.14 0.01 
-
0.16 
Tourism Cert. IV 0.07 0.07 
-
0.10 
-
0.41 
-
0.15 
-
0.09 0.02 
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Tourism Diploma+ 
-
0.06 
-
0.29 
-
0.28 
-
0.37 
-
0.29 
-
0.33 
-
0.25 
Veterinary Studies Cert. I 0.45 0.30 0.21 
-
0.29 0.51 0.51 
-
0.26 
Veterinary Studies Cert. II 0.10 0.08 0.13 
-
0.14 
-
0.04 
-
0.02 
-
0.07 
Veterinary Studies Cert. III 0.14 
-
0.01 
-
0.16 
-
0.10 
-
0.22 
-
0.06 
-
0.15 
Veterinary Studies Cert. IV 0.00 
-
0.19 
-
0.10 
-
0.11 
-
0.12 
-
0.14 
-
0.30 
Veterinary Studies Diploma+ 0.78 
-
0.71 - 
-
0.34 
-
0.15 
-
0.26 
-
0.32 
Visual Arts and Crafts Cert. I 
-
0.12 
-
0.11 
-
0.20 
-
0.37 
-
0.24 
-
0.42 
-
0.20 
Visual Arts and Crafts Cert. II 
-
0.13 
-
0.24 
-
0.07 0.04 
-
0.28 
-
0.26 
-
0.29 
Visual Arts and Crafts Cert. III 0.04 
-
0.13 
-
0.27 
-
0.09 
-
0.32 
-
0.36 
-
0.29 
Visual Arts and Crafts Cert. IV 
-
0.21 0.21 
-
0.28 
-
0.04 
-
0.23 
-
0.16 
-
0.33 
Visual Arts and Crafts Diploma+ 
-
0.89 0.74 
-
0.42 
-
0.35 0.51 
-
2.02 
-
0.54 
:These estimates are from a log wage regression model estimated on those aged 15-25 at the time of survey (around six months after completing 
their VET course) and who are not in study at the time of survey (used to generate our measure for expected course returns, adjusted for 
student characteristics). The dependent variable is weekly wage in 2013 Australian dollar terms, adjusted using the 2007-2013 wage price 
index by state (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013). All regression models are estimated with controls for age, gender, state and region of 
residence, full-time employment status, disability status, highest prior education status, indigenous status, whether from a non-English 
speaking background, English speaking proficiency, employment status prior to study, whether training is part of an apprenticeship/traineeship 
and whether first job after finishing training. The reference case is Building Certificate level III, which was chosen because of the large number 
of observations and because it is a qualification that is easily recognisable (the typical qualification attained to become a builder in Australia). 
The size of the sample doubles every two years. 
 - is insufficient number of observations in the Student Outcome Survey to estimate results at the ISCED 4-digit and course level and ref. is 
reference case in the estimation (Building, Certificate III). 
Source: Student Outcome Survey 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
 
Table A4: Differences in trends between Victoria and the rest of Australia during the 
pre-treatment period 
Model coefficient Course choice Course completion 
𝛿𝑝 
National skill  
shortage 
Expected  
graduate earnings 
Module  
completion 
Course  
completion 
     
2006 ref. case ref. case ref. case ref. case 
     
2007 0.000 -0.037*** -0.015** -0.031* 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) 
2008 -0.031** -0.005 -0.008 -0.065*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.014) (0.018) 
2009 -0.023* -0.015** -0.025 -0.055** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.018) 
𝐹𝛿2007=𝛿2008=𝛿2009=0  6.95** 43.79*** 75.88*** 19.73*** 
Count 783,289 835,455 838,748 854,023 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with 
critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. These represent coefficients on interaction terms between the dummy variable of Victorian 
enrolment and individual year dummies. All models are estimated with a full set of controls (as reported in Table 2). The F-statisitc is from a 
Waldt test that there are no diverging pre-reform trends between Victoria and the rest of Australia. We also estimate models excluding 2009 
because it may contain both anticipation and treatment effects, but results are similar. The corresponding F-statistics are 8.37, 64.08, 64.0 
and 29.09. 
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Table A5: Courses that averaged more than a 500 per year student increase in enrolment in Victoria following the VTG   
Course name Level Field of study Associated occupation 
Post-
reform 
years in 
shortage 
Change in average annual enrolment post-
reform (2010-12) relative to pre-reform (2006-
2009) 
    
 Public Private Total % 
         
Hospitality Cert. III General Education  n.a. n.a. 1384 2135 3519 247 
General Education For Adults Cert. II General Education  n.a. n.a. 3133 160 3292 131 
Vocational Preparation Cert. I General Education  n.a. n.a. 1790 833 2623 - 
General Education For Adults Cert. I General Education  n.a. n.a. 2447 -5 2442 109 
Hospitality Cert. II Food and Hospitality n.a. n.a. 1505 924 2429 129 
Carpentry Cert. III Building Carpenters and Joiners 0 1574 461 2035 8481 
Retail Cert. III Sales and Marketing Sales Assistants (General) 0 431 1557 1988 298 
Retail Cert. II Sales and Marketing Sales Assistants (General) 0 546 1405 1951 120 
Children's Services Cert. III 
Human Welfare 
Studies and Services Child Carers 3 1299 578 1876 8934 
Construction Cert. I Building 
Building and Plumbing 
Labourers 0 1266 8 1275 - 
Business Administration Cert. IV 
Business and 
Management Office Managers 0 184 1024 1208 581 
Business Administration Cert. III Office Studies General Clerks 0 321 849 1170 159 
Business Cert. II Office Studies General Clerks 0 327 809 1136 113 
General Education For Adults 
(Introductory) Cert. I General Education  n.a. n.a. 1132 -3 1129 157 
Plumbing Cert. III Building Plumbers 2 1048 49 1097 4220 
Hairdressing Cert. III Personal Services Hairdressers 3 559 434 993 - 
Electrotechnology Electrician Cert. III 
Electrical and 
Electronic Engineering 
and Technology Electricians 1 831 153 984 114 
Victorian Certificate Of Applied 
Learning (Foundation) Cert. I General Education  n.a. n.a. 876 27 903 - 
General Education For Adults Cert. III General Education  n.a. n.a. 784 75 859 118 
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Hospitality (Commercial Cookery Cert. III Food and Hospitality Cooks 3 641 143 784 131 
Building And Construction 
(Bricklaying, Carpentry, Painting 
And Decorating) Cert. II Building Wall and Floor Tilers 0 690 42 731 27 
Electrotechnology Studies (Pre-
Vocational) Cert. II 
Electrical and 
Electronic Engineering 
and Technology n.a. n.a. 650 67 717 79 
Transport And Logistics 
(Warehousing) Cert. III 
Other Engineering and 
Related Technologies Storepersons 0 52 637 689 565 
Business Cert. III Office Studies General Clerks 0 221 416 637 96 
Children's Services (Early 
Childhood Education) Diploma+ 
Human Welfare 
Studies and Services Child Care Centre Managers 3 524 109 634 7042 
Fitness Cert. IV Sport and Recreation Fitness Instructors 0 98 487 584 115 
Aged Care Cert. III 
Human Welfare 
Studies and Services Aged and Disabled Carers 0 387 192 579 6431 
Business Cert. III Office Studies General Clerks 0 117 457 573 - 
Customer Contact Cert. III Sales and Marketing 
Call or Contact Centre 
Workers 0 4 564 567 247 
Hospitality (Kitchen Operations) Cert. II Food and Hospitality Kitchenhands 0 444 96 539 65 
         
All Courses    
 19007 13606 32613 53 
There are VET 3742 courses with at least one enrolled student between 2006 and 2012 in Australia. n.a. no appropriate, either because the course is a general course or because there is no one occupation that the course 
is designed to prepare students for. - could not be estimated because there were no enrolments pre-reform. 
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Table A6: Impacts of VTG on graduate annual earnings from courses associated with 
skill shortage areas, standard counterfactual trend assumptions 
Constant treatment effect -0.064*** 
 (0.015) 
Time-varying treatment effect  
2010 -0.038 
 (0.041) 
2011 -0.076** 
 (0.030) 
Count 72,436 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with 
critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. The results are from difference-in-difference estimation of annual earnings from the national 
Student Outcome Survey (SOS) VET graduate data of 16- 25 year-olds for 2005-2011. The estimated effects of the reforms on graduate 
earnings represent the coefficients on three-way interactions between a post-reform dummy (or post-reform year dummy), a dummy of 
whether the student was a graduate from a course that was associated with an occupation on the previous year’s skill shortage list and 
dummy for the state of Victoria. All models control for socio-economic background, highest prior education, employment status prior to 
study, current employment status, age in years, state, region and year fixed effects, qualification level attained, gender and indigenous and 
disability status. 
 
Table A7: Difference-in-differences estimates for course choice outcomes using skill 
demand information in 2012 that is available at the time of enrolment in 2011, standard 
counterfactual trend assumptions 
 
Unconditional 
With individual 
controls 
With individual and 
provider controls 
  
National 
skill 
shortage 
Expected 
earnings 
National 
skill 
shortage 
Expected 
earnings 
National 
skill 
shortage 
Expected 
earnings 
 
      
Constant treatment effect 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.027** 0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Time-varying treatment 
effect 
      
2010 0.030*** 0.017** 0.025*** 0.018** 0.023** 0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2011 0.020** 0.022* 0.022*** 0.027** 0.020* 0.028** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
2012 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.039** 0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) 
       
Count 1,405,010 1,596,470 1,400,325 1,591,079 1,399,907 1,590,630 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state and territory level with 
critical values based on T(8-1) distribution. 
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Table A8: Results for the sensitivity analysis, 2010-2012, under alternative 
counterfactual trend assumptionsa with full set of controls 
  
National skill 
shortage 
Course 
graduate 
wage 
Module 
completion 
Course 
completion 
   
  
Standard estimates (Tables 3 and 5) 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.041*** 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
Enrolments restricted to Albury and Wodonga 0.078*** 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.039*** 
local government areasa (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) 
Restrict to 18-19 year-olds 0.061* 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.053*** 
 (0.031) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
Omit enrolments from August 2008 to December 2009 0.052*** 0.064*** - - 
 (0.015) (0.011) - - 
Omit enrolments from July 2012 0.051*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Include college fixed effects 0.049*** 0.049***  
 
 (0.010) (0.008)   
Include college and provider fixed effects - - 0.019** 0.037*** 
 - - (0.006) (0.007) 
Excluding fee-for-service courses 0.038* 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.041** 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) 
Excluding courses not linked to an occupation - 0.032*** - - 
 - (0.005) - - 
Excluding expected wages with missing 4-digit cells - 0.045*** - - 
 - (0.008) - - 
Wild bootstrapped standard errors 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.026** 0.041*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
 ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Unless otherwise stated, results are generated with a full set of student 
and college controls with state cluster-robust standard errors and critical values from T(8-1) distribution. 
 aCounterfactual outcomes in Victoria are assumed to diverge relative to the Rest of Australia at the same constant rate present prior to the 
reform (2006-09).b Local government areas (LGAs) is an Australian standard geographical classification that covers the administrative 
boundaries of local governments, similar to counties in the United States. The LGAs of Albury (in Victoria) and Wodonga (in NSW) are 
divided by the Murray River, which is the Victoria and NSW state border. This model is estimated on a sample size of 1962 and 3073 
observations for national skill shortage and course graduate wage respectively. Standard errors are robust-clustered at the state level with 
T(2-1) critical values.  cWe use the cgmwildboot program (provided by Judson Caskey, https://sites.google.com/site/judsoncaskey/data) to 
estimate p-values based on wild bootsrapped standard errors clustered at the state and territory level with 1000 draws. The program produces 
p-values (reported in square brackets) that are based on empirical T(8-1) distribution.  
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